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ABSTRACT 
The Southern separatist movement in Yemen represents a major threat to the Republic of 
Yemen’s stability and, consequently, to regional and international security. It started as a 
rights-based social movement led by the Southern military officers who were forced to 
retire after the 1994 civil war. Searching for solutions to the embers of unrest under the 
ashes of grievances against government ignorance and their marginalization, these 
separatists established a Southern-based social movement called Al-Hirak Al-Janubi.  
Al-Hirak Al-Janubi has had great political opportunities, mobilizing structures, 
and great narratives to sell. Al-Houthies’ Northern problem, the 2006 presidential 
election, and the Arab Spring opened political opportunities for Al-Hirak Al-Janubi. Al-
hirak’s charismatic leadership, financial resources, and activists’ recruitment bases 
provided great mobilizing structures, and Yemeni government corruption, wrong policies, 
and discrimination against Southerners provided the movement with the cause, and 
supported its narrative. However, Al-Hirak’s success will be limited to disrupting 
Yemen’s stability and security. It is not equipped to separate the South from the rest of 
Yemen but can cause much trouble. 
Therefore, the Yemeni government, with regional and international support, 
should act instantly to make an end to Southern grievances by returning stolen lands, 
restoring Southern dignity, and supporting moderate factions of the movement to accept 
dialogue. More importantly, the government should purify itself by fighting corruption, 
improving its public administration, making an end to discrimination, and providing 
social services to its entire population regardless of the region, affiliation, gender, or 
status. 
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A. THE PROBLEM AND CONCERN OF THE THESIS 
The Republic of Yemen has become one of the weakest countries in the world. 
The state faces extreme economic, political, and security challenges.1 Its central control is 
challenged by Al Houthies in the North, tribal leaders in the East, and AQAP in every 
meter of the country.  Political parties are feeding instability and weakening the central 
government by undermining its efforts to provide basic services and security for the 
people by supporting sabotage against government institutions, and fighting over power, 
while the country is struggling to stand on its feet.  
The only threat that can tear Yemen apart and, consequently, produce huge 
instability to the region2 is the Southern separation social movement that is called (Al-
Hirak Al-Janubi). While Yemen is facing different economic, social, security, and 
political challenges, Al-Hirak Al-Janubi, as Haidar and Stracke assert “is growing in 
terms of members, supporters, and sympathizers, and broadening networks and activities 
in the main cities of the South.”3  
The Southern Separation Movement (Al-Hirak Al-Janubi) that was easy to shape 
when it began poses a very serious threat—not just to Yemen’s security—but to the 
existence of the country’s unity as a whole. The Southern people know they deserve 
respect, equal treatment, and equal opportunities with their Northern brothers. To obtain 
their rights, they know they have to do something. Therefore, Southern people are 
climbing what Mogaddam called “the staircase”4 to search for opportunities and get their 
rights. If they find only closed doors, like they found before, they will, for sure, join Al-
Hirak and use all means to separate the South from the North.  
                                                 
.1 Kamil A. Mahdi, Anna Wurth, and Helen Lahner, eds., Yemen into the Twenty-first Century: 
Continuity and Challenges (UK: Ithaca Press, 2007), 425.  
.2 Nicole Stracke and Mohammed Saif Haidar, “The Southern Movement in Yemen,” Sheba Center 
for Strategic Studies (April 2010), http://www.metransparent.com/spip.php?article9779. 
.3 Ibid. 
.4 Fathali Moghaddam, “The Staircase to Terrorism: A Psychological Exploration,” American 
Psychologist (March 2005): 161.  
 2 
The purpose of this thesis is to understand the underlying factors behind the 
success of a separatist movement in a society that considers unity an ultimate principle. It 
will answer the question why unity fans are willing to die for separation. It examines the 
existing threat to the country’s unity to anticipate the future of the Al-Hirak Al-Janubi’s 
social movement in its competition with the Yemeni government for popular support.  
The thesis argues that the congestion in the South is a product of the Yemeni 
Government’s ignorance and marginalization of the Southerner’s rights and grievances in 
Yemen. Therefore, it illustrates the need for an immediate engagement with the Southern 
people by the Yemeni government as well as the need for support by the international 
organization, along with regional and international powers, to absorb the problem and 
lower the potential temper, hence securing the country’s unity and improving regional 
and global stability.  
B. LITERATURE REVIEW  
Stephen Day has produced a very valuable book about contemporary Yemen that 
studies regionalism and rebellion in Yemen. He considers the Al-Hirak Al-Janubi 
uprising to be the beginning of the Arab Spring, and not the other way around. He claims 
five precedents behind the rise and the strength of Al-Hirak Al-Janubi: the outcome of 
1994 and the government repression and corruption that planted the seeds of the 
movement; the forced early retirement of civilian and military employees (especially Ali 
Naser’s partisan in 1998); the activities of the public forum for the Sons of Southern and 
Eastern Provinces during Ramadan 2001–2002 that brought it to the forefront; the 
surprising public support among citizens across the South for the 2006 presidential 
campaign of Fainsal Bin Shamlan; and the interpretation of the 2005–2006 success of Al 
Houthies that strengthened it and made it possible.5  
Christopher Boucek and Marina Ottaway edited Yemen on the Brink on the eve of 
the Arab Spring that explains the implications of the Houthies rebellion on the stability of 
the country and the degree of support for the Al-Hirak uprising. It explains mostly all 
                                                 
.5 Stephen W. Day, Regionalism and Rebellion in Yemen: A Troubled National Union (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012), 228. 
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contemporary threats, not only to the government, but to the nation, especially when such 
threats happen in the same time period.6 
The article, “Breaking Point: Yemen’s Southern Question,” describes, with a 
relatively detailed report, the history, causes, activities, and future of the Southern 
separation movement (Al-Hirak Al-Janubi), and the internal and external players who are 
effectively involved in one way or another in Al-Hirak Al-Janubi movement. The article 
describes the political opportunity of the Arabic spring that sparked the movement and 
gives it the weight it has today. The report recommends different approaches to end the 
movement and weighs these approaches’ strengths and weaknesses, as well as makes 
recommendations for the different players inside and outside Yemen to take in order to 
solve the issue for a more secure Yemen.7   
In “Yemen’s Forever War: Political Instability in the South,” April Alley gives 
the reader a general insight into the current Southern problem. The article does not give 
detailed information about the Southern grievances and causes of the recent unrest. 
However, for those who are unfamiliar with the problem, this article may open the door 
to the Southern movement, in general, and give a recent picture of the Yemeni security 
situation. 
In “The Southern Movement,” Stracke and Haidar provide detailed information 
about the relationship, establishment, and leaders of different factions of the Southern 
separation movement. This article focuses more on the short- and long-term strategies 
that the Yemeni government should implement to ensure the Southern social movement 
could not move to the extreme left. For Stracke and Haidar, the Southern movement is 
still not united in itself and has problems among its different factions. Therefore, the 
movement may produce a security threat but cannot challenge the legitimacy of the 
central government.8 The article was produced prior to the Arab Spring. The Arab Spring 
                                                 
.6 Christopher Boucek and Marina Ottaway, eds., Yemen on the Brink (Washington, DC: Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, 2010). 
.7 “Breaking Point? Yemen’s Southern Question,” Middle East Report N 114, International Crisis 
Group (October 20, 2011), accessed March 12, 2013, http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-
North-africa/iraq-iran-gulf/yemen/114-breaking-point-yemens-Southern-question.aspx.  
.8 Stracke and Haidar, “The Southern Movement in Yemen.”  
 4 
produced great changes for the Southern separation movement and new challenges for 
Yemen.  
In “the Southern Movement in Yemen,” Dahlgren provides information on the 
establishment of the Southern movement and its use of the Internet to send messages 
inside and outside Yemen. It provides an insight into the reasons behind the social 
movement and also states how simple problems become great problems if not treated 
correctly and immediately.9  
C. METHODOLOGY  
Glenn Robinson, following the Social Movement theory that generally focuses on 
groups as the proper units for analysis when explaining collective actions, asserts that 
Hamas is a social movement.10 In his description, a social movement falls between 
general structural theories that analyze relatively large units, and rational theory that 
tends to analyze individual rational choices. Social movement theory tends to utilize three 
fundamentals:  it analyzes how political opportunity structures impact the observed 
group’s existence; it focuses on the structures and institutions of the groups under 
observation; and it looks at the group under study in a cultural frame. In Social 
Movement theory, culture cannot be ignored as the group is affected by what is around 
it.11 
Utilizing the Social Movement theory, this thesis will conduct a case study of the 
Southern separation movement (Al-Hirak Al-Janubi) in Yemen to understand the factors 
that underlie its success. The study will focus on the political opportunity the Southern 
separation movement exploited, the institution and structures of the separation 
movement, how the culture of separation and the general feeling of discrimination in the 
Southern part of the country supported this movement, and what the Yemeni government 
                                                 
.9 Susanne Dahlgren, “The Southern Movement in Yemen,” ISIM Review 22 (2008), 
https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/bitstream/handle/1887/17267/ISIM_22_The_Southern_Movement_inYem
en.pdf?sequence=1. 
.10 Glenn E. Robinson, “Hamas as Social Movement,” in Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory 
Approach, ed. Quintan Wicktorowicz (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2004). 
.11 Ibid. 
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could have done to absorb and shape the movement to the benefit of the state. In studying 
this social movement, we will look at the Arab Spring as a beginning for political 
opportunity, the institutions Al-Hirak Al-Janubi already has, the cultural effect on their 
social movement, the narratives of the movement, and the possible outcomes if the 
separation social movement is not shaped and absorbed by the Yemeni government in 
support of the international community.  
The RAND study, “Factor Tree for Public Support,” has provided a very useful 
tool to study the public support of social movements,12 which we will use to explain the 
cultural framing and its impact on Al-Hirak Al-Janubi’s popularity and motivations. 
Jennifer Earl uses three key typology dimensions to categorize repression of a given 
movement. Those dimensions are the identity of the repressive agent, the character of the 
repressive actions, and whether the repressive actions are observable.13 We will use 
Earl’s typology of repression as an attempt to understand the effects on the relationship 
between the government and Al-Hirak Al-Janubi in Yemen. 
D. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
Chapter II discusses the roots of the Southern separation movement by providing 
the history of Yemen before unity.  It also focuses on domestic and international factors 
that lead to unity; the shortfalls of unity procedures and practices that lead to the 1993 
crises; the parliamentary election consequences that lead to 1994 civil war and the 
initiation of Al-Hirak in 2007; and how in 2009, Al-Hirak became the harvest of the 
economic, social, and cultural grievances that political, military, and tribal leaders in 
Yemen planted in the early 1990s and 2000s.  
Chapter III contains an analysis of the main political opportunities that lead to the 
initiation of the movement, the support for its existence, and the participation in its 
sustainment. The discussion also explains the consequence of the Houthies rebellions on 
                                                 
.12 Paul K. Davis, Eric V. Larson, Zachary Haldeman, Mustafa Oguz, and Yashodhara Rana, 
Understanding and Influencing Public Support for Insurgency and Terrorism, National Defense Research 
Institute (RAND),(2012), http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG1122.html. 
.13Jennifer Earl, “Tanks, Tear Gas, and Taxes: Toward a Theory of Movement Repression,” American 
Sociological Association 21, no. 1(March, 2003), http://www.jstor.org/stable/3108608. 
 6 
the reputation of the government, and how the rebellions contributed to the strength of 
the Al-Hirak Al-Janubi. The 2006 presidential election broke the shield of the Sana’a 
administration and revealed the possibility of a change. During this time, the Arab Spring 
enabled the Southerners to openly call for separation and arrange a huge demonstration. 
Finally, government repression added to the previously mentioned opportunities and 
contributed to the growth of the movement.  
Chapter IV focuses on the mobilizing structures that played into the movement’s 
strength and analyzes how the movement’s leadership, networks, factions, resources 
mobilization, and relationships between its factions, play to the strengths and weaknesses 
of the movement. 
Chapter V discusses the cultural framing that Al-Hirak Al-Janubi relies upon to 
get more supporters and legitimize its actions. This chapter also presents an explanation 
of how Al-Hirak’s ideology plays to its strengths, what motivates people to dedicate 
themselves to the cause, what the movement is able to provide to its supporters, how it 
has promoted a legitimacy of violence, and how it convinces its members to accept risks.  
Chapter VI focuses on the narratives of the movement and beliefs among 
Southerners. It analyzes the existence and effectiveness of Al-Hirak Al-Janubi’s 
diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational narratives, and its ability to frame these 
narratives and utilize them to get more popular support.   
Chapter VII presents a summary and conclusions of the findings of the thesis and 
recommendations to the Yemeni government, Al-Hirak Al-Janubi, and the international 
community which favored Yemen as a secure and stable country.    
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II. ROOTS OF THE MOVEMENT 
A. HISTORY OF YEMENI UNITY 
The Republic of Yemen (ROY), as it is known today, was not first born in May 
22, 1990. It was an offspring of several attempts by both the Northern and Southern parts 
of the country, either unilaterally or bilaterally. Throughout history, as Hassan Boutaleb 
asserts, Yemen experienced centralized administration periods more often than times of 
separation.14 In modern times, Cairo’s agreement (ittifagiat al-gahirah) in 1972 and 
Tripoli’s agreement (Ittifagiat Trabulis) on November 28, 1972, represent a joint effort 
by both parts of the country to reunify. Both agreements had set the stage for the 1990’s 
declaration of the united Yemen.15 However, unilateral attempts by the South were 
parallel to the joint attempts. For example, the National Movement Front in the early 
1980s represented an eagerness of the South to unify Yemen at the time by force. 
Abdulfattah Ismaeil, the president of the South at the time, called for instant unity in the 
Kuwait Agreement (Itifaqiat Al-Kwait 1977), while the Northern part had some 
reservations and asked for more time to negotiate and prepare for the unification 
process.16 
1. Yemen’s Unity: One Nation in Two States 
Just like Germany, Vietnam, and the Korean peninsula, Yemen’s separation and 
reunification was affected by global conflicts and the Cold War between great global 
powers. Yemen was only one state under the Ottoman Empire’s rule until 1839 when 
Great Britain occupied the Southern part of the country. The Ottoman Empire and Great 
Britain finally implemented partitioning of the territory of Yemen into North and South 
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 8 
in 1905.17 They finalized their agreement on borders between the North and the South in 
1914.18 Nonetheless, the Yemeni people had no say in this agreement and did not 
recognize it as a legitimate action.19  
Directly after WWI, the Ottoman Empire surrendered its power and legitimacy to 
the Imam Yahya Muhammad Hamied Al-Deian who refused to participate with Sharif 
Hussein in fighting against the Ottoman Empire and remained partial throughout the war. 
Soon after he established the Mutawakelite Kingdom of Yemen (Al-Mamlakah Al-
Mutawakkilīyah Al-Yamanīyah), he announced his willingness to bring back the Southern 
part of the country, and supported the resistance groups in the South to free the country 
from British occupation.20 However, due to a huge gap in technology and army 
professionalism between the Northern part of Yemen and England, the North was 
defeated and was only able to hold the mountains. Hodeida was occupied, and Great 
Britain supported Al-Idrissi and the Saudi family after that in their fight against the 
North. Having no other choice, the imam signed an agreement with England in 1934 in 
which he agreed to give up the South, at the time, in exchange for peace.21 
Despite the 1934 and 1950 agreements between them, during the time from 1918 
until 1962, both Britain and the Mutawakelite Kingdom of Yemen (Al-Mamlakah Al-
Mutawakkilīyah Al-Yamanīyah) supported resistance groups of the other side. What is 
called the Revolution of 1962 in the North was a result of British support for 
revolutionaries. Aden was their safe haven and base for their propaganda and 
newspapers.22 However, the outcomes of the revolution in the North were very 
disappointing for the British side. One of the six goals of the revolution in Sanaʿa was to 
free the South and reunite the county. As a result of the October 14, 1963 revolution, the 
young regime in Sanaʿa supported the resistance groups with safe havens, weapons, 
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money, and media until the occupation was forced to leave Aden. Just like their brothers 
in the North, the Southern revolutionaries made reunification of the country their main 
goal. The Southern constitution “declared the South to be a part of a single Yemeni 
nation.”23 Although both the North and the South were aiming, planning, and taking 
serious steps to reunify the county, each side was doing so on their own terms. In 
addition, the Cold War overcame the situation in Yemen, which became a proxy for the 
USSR in the South and the U.S. in the North.24 
Unity continued to be the dream of the Yemeni people, the Yemeni government, 
and stakeholders on each side. Both sides would go to war or clash over the borders, but 
when they met, instead of discussing current problems at the time, unity would consume 
the entire meeting.25 Between 1970 and 1990, several meetings were conducted, but the 
primary meetings took place on October 28, 1972, during the Cairo agreement (itifaq 
alqahirah 1972). In this agreement, both countries decided to reunify the county26 but 
then the North side did not take steps forward as a result of the USSR’s intervention in 
the South and the fear by the West that Northern Yemen would move toward the 
communist side. The Tripoli Agreement of November 1972 (Ittifaq Trabulis 1972) 
followed the Cairo agreement. In the Tripoli agreement, the two leaders agreed to take 
serious steps to unify the country, including the agreement to change the name of the new 
state to the Republic of Yemen, which then replaced the names of both states.27 On 
February 28, 1973, the presidents from the North and South met and signed the 
agreement.   
In February 1977, the Qataba Agreement (itifagiat Kaʿtaba1977) called for the 
establishment of several committees to solve the border issues and study collective 
benefits between the new single nation’s parts, including a unified foreign policy, and 
                                                 
.23 Robert W. Stookey, South Yemen: A Marxist Republic in Arabia (Boulder, Colorado: Westview 
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joint share of the oil revenues in Marib and Shabwa.28 The 1979 Kuwait Agreement 
between Ali Abdullah Saleh and Abdul Fattah Ismael (ittifagiat Al- Kwait 1979) called 
for instant and simple unity; however, Ali Saleh asked for time to discuss a federal 
system with the people in the North.29 In 1989, the Sanaʿa Agreement (Ittifagiat Sanaʿa 
1988) defined unarmed borders and uncontrolled movement of the Yemeni people 
between Sanaʿa and Aden, and established unified investment and joint-development 
programs.  
In November 1989, during the Aden agreement (Ittifag Aden 1989), Ali Abdullah 
Saleh of the North and Ali Salem al-Beedh of the South agreed to finalize the steps and 
combine the two parts of Yemen.30 This 1989 Agreement led to the declaration of unity 
between the two parts of Yemen on May 22, 1990.31 
2. The Reunification of 1990 
On May 22, 1990, Ali Abdullah Saleh raised the unity flag in Aden. Throughout 
the country, people were celebrating, dancing their traditional dances, and congratulating 
each other for the upcoming bright future. Finally, the dream became true. Reunification 
came as a result of the end of the Cold War and change in the international system. The 
Soviet Union seized its aid to many countries, including the democratic Republic of 
Yemen.32 As Norman Cigar asserts, “The USSR ha[d] become a dominant factor in the 
local economy, and its aid had engendered a real dependence on Moscow.”33 Unity then 
became a necessity, not only for history and long-term benefits to the country, but also 
for the short-term survival. Additionally, with support from the U.S., reunification moved 
forward and reduced the fear of communist intervention.  
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For the Yemeni people, unity was the norm, and separation was an exception.  
Ordinary people did not look at all the regional and international changes that allowed 
reunification to happen. So the people in the North and the South were eager to see their 
country reunified and their brothers’ conflicts ended. However, this was not the case with 
both administrations in the North and the South. Both administrations signed the 
agreement in fear that the other had hidden plans. Two extremely different ideologies 
were uniting in one body, just as the people were being united. The Southern 
administration believed in a one-party system and was extremely ideological, espousing a 
Marxist and Lenin-based philosophy. The Northern administration was comprised of a set 
of tribes and was supporting Islamic groups to contain Socialism. An international group 
report examining this period indicated, “From the start, this was a troubled unification 
that resulted in a short, bloody civil war in 1994.”34 
Fear and lack of trust between the two administrations played to the benefit of the 
newly established state. It established a new constitution that allowed for a multiple party 
system, parliamental elections, separation of the administrative, legislative, and judicial 
systems, and set the stage for presidential elections. The period from 1990 to 1993 was 
the best democratic time for Yemen. A new constitution was formed and set for 
referendum, the people began discussing their constitution and understood what it meant 
to have a voice in it, and debates about the constitution were held throughout the county. 
Debates and disputes between major players were mostly political and peaceful disputes; 
however, fear also played into the crises in the country before and after the 1993 
parliamentary election, which lead to the civil war in 1994 and consequently led to the 
grievances of the Southern people, and to the establishment of the separationist 
movement (Al-Hirak Al-Janubi). 
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3. 1993 Parliamentary Election 
Instead of spurring unity, the 1993 Parliament election reinforced the divide 
between the main parties in the Yemeni government.35 The Southern system was more 
professional than the Northern tribal system. The South had more educated figures, along 
with a British-adapted administration and finance system,36 and professional military; 
however, economically, the South was a failed state. The North contained a poor 
administration, an Ottoman and Egyptian financial system,37 and was relatively more 
corrupt. However, it was better off economically. Therefore, as Abdul Karim Alaug 
asserts, “comparatively stronger Northern governorates were in a position to dominate the 
South economically.”38 Both Sanaʿa and Aden planned to govern the entire Republic of 
Yemen.  
The Yemen Socialist Party (YSP) had supporters in the North. With those 
supporters, it planned to win the election and take the whole country under its rule. In 
fact, “Article 2 of the Southern Yemeni constitution asserts the claim of the YSP to the 
leadership of the entire nation.”39  On the Northern side, Ali Abdullah Saleh was eager to 
unify the country because he knew this would add his name to history. Although Saleh 
was willing to offer some concessions, his followers were acting the same as the YSP. 
The YSP attracted Northern military officers and educated figures who had visited or 
studied in the USSR. They knew they had something in common and were able to gain 
many supporters who believed in communist ideals and philosophies. 
Implementing the end justifies the means philosophy, each side planned and acted 
to win the election. Two main points contributed to the failure of the YSP to win a 
majority in the parliamentary election. First, the YSP maintained full control of the 
Southern part of the country, which contained only 30 percent of the parliamentary seats. 
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Therefore, the YSP had to compete with the General People’s Congress (GPC) and other 
Islamic parties for governmental control. Next, because the YSP’s leaders misunderstood 
the strong Northern tribal system, the tribal system survived in the North and enjoyed 
control of the Yemeni society while, in the South, the YSP managed to end that control. 
The YSP’s nominees for the election were mainly educated figures and retired military 
officers. Nevertheless, the GPC’s candidates were shayhks or religious figures. When a 
Shaykh in Yemen ran for election, he should win or the tribe’s pride would be affected. 
As Stephen Day asserts, “While the South had a long-term view of unity, the Northern 
regime focused on a short-term agenda to maintain the status quo [that gave the Northern 
regime a relative superiority in the election].”40 Ali Saleh’s close figures ensured winning 
the election by all means. To promote this, military commanders ordered their soldiers 
who were assigned to guard the ballots to steal them and change the election sites to card 
counting sites. As a result, the GPC won 121 out of 301 seats in parliament, the Islah won 
62 seats, and the YSP won 56 seats.41 The election results for the YSP were not pleasant, 
even though it won most of Southern seats and shared some in the North, including 18 
seats from independent members that were added to the 56 seats.42 
4. A Story of Crises  
Immediately after the unification of the country, the Yemeni political crisis began. 
As Brehony asserts, “The economic situation and the assassinations led to an accelerating 
deterioration in relations between the YSP and GPC leaders in 1992.” 43 However, the 
election results ignited the problems denied in the early 1990s. 
While the GPC and Islah parties were very happy about their gain in 1993’s 
parliamentary election, the YSP realized its weight in the Yemeni political system. 
Although winning an election was one step, the YSP needed to begin to plan for other 
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means of survival. Hostile acts had begun, and political traps were initiated by all parties. 
Realizing how important the shayhks were in the North, the YSP began supporting the 
shayhks of the Northern tribes against the Sana’a, especially the Bakill tribal 
confederation.44 Taking advantage of the new Ministry of Defense, the YSP issued 
guns45 and money to some tribes to gain their support.  
The YSP plans succeeded to a certain degree in gaining supporters among 
Northern tribes; however, as Dresch and Haykel explain, the following degree of support 
was gained by the YSP in the North before the 1994 civil war. 
A number of local shayhks at odds with Abdullah [Al-ahmar] went at 
some point to the Socialists. More generally, however, there was 
sympathy for the YSP, expressed or discussed largely in private: most of 
Dhu Faric seemed to prefer the YSP, per- haps 70 percent of Dhu Khayran 
did so, perhaps 30-40 percent of Fadl and Jabr, and of this latter fraction 
about one-half showed sustained interest. All other things being equal, 
perhaps 60–70 percent of Al-ʿusaymat might in some degree have favored 
the Socialists.46  
GCP and Islah were doing the same, 47especially with the Zumra. Besides, the Al-
Islah Islamic party was built on hatred of communism. Defeating the YSP meant they 
would get to win the Southern seats and defeat the GPC as well. Therefore, the Islah 
party mobilized its people for Jihad to end communism in Yemen.  
War mobilization from both the North and the South was continuous, while 
political agreements and mediation were conducted. During the mediation on Taiz (Jami 
aljanad), the Northern tribal and religious leaders met with Ali Salem al-Beedh. They 
had thrown their Jah,48 or so-called ʿmamah,49 to get him to come back to Sanaʿa and 
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stop mobilization. Ali Salem made another mistake, which reflected his misunderstanding 
of the tribal system. He left the Jah and responded impolitely to those tribal and religious 
leaders. When they came back to Sanaʿa, their hearts were with Ali Abdullah Saleh.  
The leadership of the YSP made yet another mistake in Amman Jordan, when the 
leaders signed what is called “the Document of Pledge and Accord” (Wathigat Al-Ahd 
Walittifaq) on February 20, 1994. After both sides signed the agreement, Ali Saleh and 
Ali Salem delivered speeches. Ali Saleh called on disputants to forgive and forget. He 
asked Yemenis to forget the past and start fresh to build a new country. Unlike Ali Saleh, 
Ali Salem revealed his concerns and mistrust about Ali Saleh’s intentions and willingness 
to implement the agreed upon points.50 Although Ali Salem’s speech was more realistic 
and valuable, people in Yemen were happy about Ali Saleh’s speech because he gave 
them what they wanted to hear. After both parties’ signatures, Ali Saleh returned to 
Sanaʿa but Ali Salem along with Salem Saleh Mohammed moved to Saudi Arabia which 
had a bad relationship with Sanaʿa at that time. 51 Ali Saleh exploited Ali Salem’s visit to 
Saudi Arabia to blame him for the failure of the agreement and started planning to move 
the battle to the South. 
Besides, the history of the YSP played to its defeat in both election and civil war. 
On February 22, 1972, several shayhks from Northern Yemen lead by Naji Ben Ali Al 
Ghader, mostly form Bakil, Khawlan, were invited for a conference in the PDRY. They 
were promised support. However, during lunch, they were massacred. Therefore, when 
tribal Shaykhs had to decide whom to support, Ali Abdullah Saleh or Ali Salem Al-bied, 
they brought back the memories of their fathers and brothers. The promise of support 
from Ali Salem was not a trustworthy one. Ali Abdullah Saleh took advantage of the 
issue and kept reminding supporters of the YSP of what could happen to them. He gave 
them the opportunity to come back without punishment and keep the money and weapons 
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they got from the YSP. The secret agreements were revealed by the president only when 
the civil war started.52 
The war occurred first at Amran and then in Dhamar, the YSP plan was that 
Southern brigades would initiate the clashes, and then loyal tribes would mobilize their 
people and assault important cities. Then the Southern army would move toward Sanaʿa. 
The Northern GCP and Islah had a secret agreement with tribal leaders to continue their 
promises to the YSP of support but not to do so. Therefore, when the problem started in 
Amran the Southern brigade surrendered and then in Dhamar the other strong brigade 
surrendered. The Northern tribal leaders then dedicated themselves to support Ali 
Abdullah Saleh. First because they did not trust YSP if they were to win, and more so 
they saw Ali Abdullah Saleh winning.  
The civil war that started in late April and ended early July 1994 resulted in the 
defeat of the YSP whose leaders fled to Gulf countries while Ali Saleh’s regime claimed 
to strengthen unity with soldiers’ blood.  While Ali Saleh was called the unity hero, the 
Southern people were suffering from his followers’ corruption, discrimination, and 
marginalization. The Yemeni 1994 Civil war, as Hussein asserts, had “widened the gap 
between the North and the South. Little effort to narrow the rift and bring actual unity 
between the people of the two pasts of Yemen has been made.”53 
B. SOUTHERNERS’ GRIEVANCES AND THE RISE OF THE MOVEMENT 
The roots of the Southern separatist movement (Al-Hirak Al-Janubi), goes back to 
1994. However, “the first significant appearance of the South Yemen Movement on the 
political scene in Yemen was in 2007 in the form of mass protests and demonstrations 
organized by human rights associations of retired military and civilian groups.”54 At the 
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time of its establishment, “Al-Hirak originated as a rights-based movement requesting 
equality under the law and a change in relations between North and South—all within a 
united country. The government responded to the demands with repression; it also largely 
ignored its own promises of reforms.”55  However, by 2009, the rights-based movement 
had changed its path and raised the ceiling on its demands as the movement began to 
champion Southern independence.56  
In its report to the National Dialogue Conference (NDC) (Mutamar alhiwar 
alwatani alshamil), the Southern case team laid out the Southern grievances and roots of 
the problem through political, economic, judicial, and cultural dimensions. The report 
considers the 1994 civil war and what happened afterward as the roots of the Southern 
grievances that led to the establishment of Al-Hirak social movement. These contributing 
factors represented the abolition of the Southern political, economic, and cultural 
partnership.57  
1. Economic Grievances 
War looting and vandalism (Faid)58 characterized the Yemeni civil war.59 It was 
the fast approach for corrupt military officers, tribal leaders (shaykhs) and some religious 
leaders to get rich. Looting was largely organized. “Looters arrived in trucks and larger 
vehicles and loaded up equipment and machinery.”60 The administration in the North 
supported and allowed the idea of faid among its supporters to encourage more people to 
join the fight. This culture of faid in the war in Yemen was a clever recruitment tactic.61 
Nevertheless, in the long term, it created critical problems and created serious grievances 
among Southern people who were victims of looting regardless of their side, opinion, or 
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actions. Looting was the first impression the Yemeni citizens in the South knew about the 
Northern people. However, according to the Human Rights Watch, looting was initiated 
by separatist officials, especially of Aden, in the last days of the war.”62 
Looting was not only associated with the 1994 civil war; military leaders and 
strong officials, mostly from the North, under supervision and support from the 
administration, looted and occupied most of the government offices, officials’ houses, 
and unused land.63 In the South, the YSP owned most of the land and businesses. After 
the civil war, instead of moving the ownership to the central government or implementing 
legal privatization, corrupted officials from the North and some from the South added 
these lands to their properties.64 Even when the government made some efforts to 
redistribute lands to landless people from the South, its actions were determined by 
political affiliations rather than any other criteria.65 In addition, oil investment was 
controlled by Northern corrupt officials who own some of the oil companies.66 
As each day passed by in Yemen, grievances were raised in the South. After the 
war, many Southerners, especially women, were sent home67or fled to the Gulf countries. 
Many military officers came back from Dubai and other gulf countries to Yemen in an 
effort to address and solve their issues and grievances. However, they were ignored and 
left to live with a fraction of their former salary since the corrupt leaders and 
administrators typically shared some of the retirees’ salaries. In Yemen, especially in the 
military, there are financial officers or clerks (kateb malis), who are often the richest 
individuals in the Yemeni military. They often own million dollar homes, because they 
get a portion of the salaries of every individual in the military. Additionally, if the 
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financial officer is no longer in uniform and remaining at home like the retired Southern 
military officers, their share is even higher.  
Financial resources support both the arguments for reunification and separatism. 
One of the main reasons behind the government of the South seeking unity in 1989 was 
economic problems. The South was very dependent upon the Soviet Union’s military and 
economic aid. As soon as the Cold War was over between the Soviet Union and the West, 
the Soviet Union washed its hands of all allies including the PDRY,68 which lowered the 
“GDP per capita by 20 percent in 1989.”69 To survive, the Southern government had to 
return to the Republic of Yemen and link itself to the Northern government.  
After reunification, Ali Saleh’s regime, using its great relations with the West, 
was able to attract many international companies to come and search for oil resources in 
Hadramaut and Shabwah. The Southern government discovered that it also had many oil 
resources that were not exploited. Because of these discoveries, Ali Salem al-Beedh 
(Unity State Vice President) began a plan, along with other significant members of the 
YSP, to re-separate the country. Their desire for separation was even greater after the 
1993 parliamentary election in which their party came in third, with only 56 seats out of 
301. 
The oil in Mareb represented a low percentage of the overall reserve relative to 
Al-Massila oil and natural gas,70 mainly because the corrupt officials from the North 
were selling oil and gas that was produced from Southern land and using it to purchase 
Southern land, which was not acceptable.  
2. Social Dimensions of the Southerners’ Grievances 
After the civil war, many officials who supported the YSP fled to neighboring 
Gulf countries, while many returned to their villages to avoid personal assassination or 
arrest. Although, the president Ali Saleh announced General Amnesty to all Southern 
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military officers and political leaders who fought on the side of separatists, excluding 
only sixteen individuals who planned and announced separation, the government did 
nothing to rebuild the trust of Southern people. The officers who fled to their villages 
were not ready to go back to their units and hold positions lower than the ones they had 
before, so they preferred to stay home. The government marginalized them even more by 
ignoring their grievances. Even their salaries were cut in half to be shared between them 
and the corrupt officials. Individuals, who were brought back to work, were brought back 
only to show balance in the general administration employment. Furthermore, individuals 
from the South were assigned to take official duties in places that have no real effect in 
decisions making. In fact, some Southern military or police officials who held important 
positions in the new administrations were nothing relative to officers who were forced to 
retire after the war. Therefore, Southern retired officers and officials did not accept the 
fact that they were getting a fraction of their salaries while others, who were nothing 
relative to them before the war, were enjoying power and money.  
Corrupt officials took the land and offices in Aden and other areas as paybacks, 
either stealing outright or paying a fraction of the price. Returning YSP officials and 
military officers did not expect to see their party’s and government land, buildings, and 
properties taken by individuals. They did not expect to see officials from the North 
control and play with the properties they protected their entire lives. They viewed those 
officials as occupiers. There was a saying about an official who was in Aden selling the 
sea, the mountains, the flat land, and the sand to Southern investors.71 While this was 
happening to them, Southern military officers did nothing to end their grievances, 
because they were afraid of the Northern system and the military. In addition, they had 
had very bad experiences from previous civil wars that resulted in the deaths of many 
innocent people in the South.  
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3. Cultural Grievances 
Sarah Philips asserts that, “to most people, the Yemeni state is an instrument 
through which a small band of elite exploits and harasses the people. This will not change 
unless the state delivers benefits and builds trust between itself and grassroots 
communities.”72 The Southern case team mentioned several cultural grievances that led 
to their movement. Some of those grievances are the exclusion and marginalization of 
Southerners, as well as treason and blasphemy toward the Southern people based on 
ideological differences and false intellectual justification that led to a large crack in the 
Yemeni society, and the inability to accommodate the cultural and social diversity of 
nation. All of which produced a deep-rooted crisis. The government in Sanaʿa glorified 
the culture of war and the role of the military and limited the Southerners’ freedom of 
expression of their social and cultural values. Douaa Hussein asserts, “The different 
power structures in the North have dominated the political field and shaped the cultural 
and legal context of the new Yemen.”73 Furthermore, ignoring the modern and 
contemporary history of the South and downplaying some of the symbols and leaders of 
the struggle as well as marginalizing and harassing the Southern media, particularly the 
Al-Ayyam newspaper reflect the government’s efforts to suppress the South. Many of the 
names of the Southern streets, schools, residential neighborhoods, public spaces, 
important campsites, and vital facilities were changed from outside to erase the collective 
memory of the Southern people in an attempt to erase the culture of the South.74 
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III. POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES 
A. AL-HOUTHIES MOVEMENT IN SAʿDAH 
In 2004, the Houthies movement was raised in North Yemen. The Yemeni 
government sent a battalion to capture Hussein Badr Addien Al-Houthi, the leader of the 
Al Houthi movement in the North. The mission failed, and as a result, many soldiers were 
killed. To restore its reputation, the government sent a brigade, reinforced by another 
brigade, and then by another brigade, until it eventually realized that nobody really 
respected the government in those areas. Estimates of the six-round war expenses are 
around 1 billion dollars in hard currency reserve,75 in addition to huge military weaponry 
loses. 
Although the government focused all its military, political, and economic 
resources on countering Al- Houthies, it failed to deal with the movement and proved to 
be a failed, corrupt, and unprofessional government. The war emboldened other 
threatening actors, such as Al-Hirak and Al-Qaeda.76 Lucas Winter states that “the 
conflict [between Al-Houthies and the Yemeni government] has wrought a humanitarian 
disaster that makes the government look negligent if not criminal.”77  
Soldiers who participated in the ceremonies were being tested in real missions and 
were proving to be failures against tribal men who had no formal military training but 
were fighters. The Houthies movement uncovered the government reality. It showed how 
weak, corrupt, unstable, and fragile the Sana’a system was. Stephen Day asserts, “After 
2005, the Houthi rebellion in the Northwest highland had a broad demonstration effect 
about the possibility of resisting the regime’s armed forces. The next year, groups in the 
Southwest region around Aden discussed ways . . . to confront Saleh’s regime.”78 As 
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Christopher Boucek asserts, “The war in Sa’da takes precedence over concurrent security 
challenges, such as confronting AQAP and resolving secessionist aspirations in the 
South.” 79 
The Houthies had no land taken or oil exploited by corrupt leaders in Sanaʿa; 
however, they had heard enough. The Southern military officers started to see themselves 
as better than the Houthies. They were successful military commanders who knew 
everything about weapons, tactics, and politics, and had grievances that Al-Houthies did 
not. They felt that if the Houthies could challenge the government, so could they. The Al- 
Houthies movement diverted the government attention to fight the wars in the North, 
giving the Southern retired civilians and military officers’ time and space to organize 
themselves and build up their movement. They did so untouched and unobserved. The 
government neither had the time to suppress them, nor to solve their grievances.  
As educated figures, Southern retired military officers tested the government’s 
ability and willingness to respond very slowly. They asked for the rest of their salaries 
that the corrupt Kateb Malis and officials had taken from them, and as April Alley states, 
“wanted greater access to government services and employment, improved rule of law, 
better resource management, plus economic and political decentralization.”80 They 
demonstrated in abandoned areas, and sometimes in urban areas, but not very powerfully. 
These demonstrations would come and go from time to time. During this period, the 
government was very busy with the problem in Saʿda. To them, the Southern people were 
not important. Besides, to demonstrate their control of the South, some Southern officials 
told the administrators that the Al-Hirak were just a very small number of people that had 
no effect whatsoever on the ground of the South. 
As time passed, the government did nothing to end retired military officers’ 
grievances. Therefore, retired officers began talking about other grievances beyond their 
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own. They had no problem selling their narratives, because the government had many 
issues that could be addressed.  
Searching for a solution to their problem, the retired military officers generated a 
Southern-based social movement called Al Hirack Al Janobi, which found supporters 
from outside and within the country. Until now, the Yemeni government has neither the 
ability to solve the Houthi movement in the North militarily, nor to get the major factions 
of the Southern separation movement to participate in the NDC.  
B. 2006 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 
The 2006 presidential election changed the political map of the Republic of 
Yemen. New alliances called the Joint Meeting Parties (JMP) were formed in support of 
a real opposition presidential candidate from the South against the president Ali Saleh. 
“Hamid Al-Ahmar, [the son of Hashid confederations’ Shaykh and the known 
businessman], was the first in the JMP suggest a Southerner as president, in order to 
actively drawn attention to the Southern problems.” 81 The new opposition alliance was 
not only able to break the system’s solid picture, but also willing to use all means 
available to defeat it including support of the Southern military officers, opening 
Southerners’ eyes to their grievances and implying acknowledgment of them.  
In addition to the Houthies’ efforts to open a space for the movement and display 
how failed, corrupt, and weak the government in Sanaʿa was, the 2006 presidential 
election opened another opportunity for the Southern military officers. Phillips asserts 
that “the Yemeni regime’s capacity to contend with domestic challenges . . . has 
diminished so much in the past two years.”82 Ali Abdullah Saleh was not able to gain the 
Islah party’s support like he did in the 1999 presidential election. The Al-Ahmar family 
did not agree with him on how to continue appropriating the rest of the government 
properties or to his plans to set his son Ahmed for presidency. The Islah party realized it 
was time to go against the president since they had the tribal side support. Although Ali 
                                                 
.81 “Breaking Point? Yemen’s Southern Question,” Middle East Report N 114, International Crisis 
Group. 
.82 Sarah Phillips, “Yemen: On the Brink: What Comes Next in Yemen? Al-Qaeda, the Tribes, and 
State-Building.” 
 26 
Abdullah Saleh had Al-Zendani’s (Al-Islah party’s religious figure) support along with 
the Shaykh of hashid Abdullah Al-Ahmar. The sons of Al-Ahmar were against him and 
did their best to support his opponent.  
Al-Ahmar’s sons (Jahal Alahmer as they were referred to by their tribe) supported 
all kinds of resistance against the president. One option was to support the retired military 
officers and some officials in the South to move forward. Al-Ahmar’s sons thought that 
when the president responded to their demands, they would tell those in the South to stop. 
Problems in Sanaʿa initiated and fed the problems in Aden, Dhale, Abien, Shabw, and 
other areas. However, when the president asked about the problem, officials from the 
South would tell him that those are separatists; no matter what you do for them, they will 
not change. The only option was ignorance.  
The roots of the Southern problem are in Sanaʿa. When the government in Sanaʿa 
was united, the problems in the South were marginal, and when the stakeholders in 
Sanaʿa started fighting each other over power and resources, they created a chance for the 
movement in the South to rise through direct or indirect support. The Southern movement 
found people in Sanaʿa who recognized their problems, supported their efforts, and 
legitimized their actions. Either side would gain their support in return for using them as 
a tool to weaken their enemy in Sanaʿa. Al-Hirak had grown until it reached a state where 
it felt strong and called for separation. Even after Ali Salem Al-Beeth called for 
separation, the governing GPC party and its allies and the opposition parties of JMP 
continued to fight each other over power and support from factions of Al-Hirak, and in an 
effort to strengthen its base in Sanaʿa.  
C. THE ARAB SPRING (AR-RABĪˁ AL-ˁARABĪ ) POLITICAL 
OPPORTUNITY  
Today, Al-Hirak Al-Janubi is a blooming rose in the Arab Spring. If the Houthi 
movement in the North and the 2006 presidential election opened a political opportunity 
for Al-Hirak to take root, the Arab Spring opened the political opportunity for the 
movement to flourish. Arab Spring has exposed the fragilities of the autocrats who have 
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ruled for so long in countries it has affected.83 However, in Yemen, after several 
movements, the Arab Spring has changed the scale of power to Al-Hirak at the expense 
of the state. The way the Arab Spring occurred, and the way it was handled, contributed 
to the favor of Al-Hirak Al-Janubi.  
Following an extension of the support of Al-Hirak during and after the 2006 
election by different factions in Sanaʿa, the Arab Spring witnessed protesters in Sanaʿa, 
Taiz, and Aden from those who had supposedly supported unity and had acknowledged 
the Southerners’ grievances. Parties in Sanaʿa fought each other by supporting different 
factions in the country, and Al-Hirak was one of them. Ali Saleh accused the youth and 
JMP of supporting the separatists. To prove him wrong, JMP agreed with Al-Hirak to 
hold their call for separation until the regime collapsed. This gave them credibility by 
acknowledging to the people that Al-Hirak would discontinue its call for separation if Ali 
Saleh would step down. That was a dangerous game played by the JMP that made the call 
of Al-Hirak more legitimate and provided an opportunity to exploit the situation to 
mobilize more supporters and organize large demonstrations. The JMP thought they 
could exploit Al-Hirak by destroying Ali Saleh, and thus stopping him. In the meantime, 
Al-Hirak was also exploiting them, which made the effort stronger than anyone’s ability 
to contain.  
Before the Arab Spring, the Yemeni parliament passed a law that regulated 
protests in the county. According to the law, those who wanted to protest had to get 
permission from the Ministry of the Interior, and then follow the route that the ministry 
provided. Although the opposition parties did not respect this law, it gave the government 
legitimacy to oppress demonstrators and enabled it to control protestors and abduct 
activists by accusing them of protesting without permission.  
The protest law vanished when the Arab Spring sparked. During the Arab Spring, 
not only did protests begin in the streets without government permission, but they also 
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destroyed the legitimacy and challenged the existence of the government itself.84 
Alexandra Lewis asserts, “The protests, which pitted citizens against law enforcement 
personnel, have had a negative impact on perceptions of police legitimacy.”85 Al-Hirak’s 
ability to organize huge protests benefited most from the Arab Spring. Although Al-Hirak 
had crossed what was called “the red line” by calling for separation, the government’s 
hands were tied and could do little to control Al-Hirak protests.  
The Yemeni Arab Spring was settled by the Gulf initiative that reflected the 
existing powers in the county against the youth’s will. Al-Saqaff asserts,  
[The Gulf initiative] led to a political settlement that reflected the existing 
internal balance of power and the influence of external parties. This has 
generated resentment among some of the revolutionary youth movements, 
and among unofficial actors such as the Houthi group in the North and the 
South Movement. These parties, as a whole, saw the Gulf Initiative as 
having betrayed the goals of the revolution, and considered it a settlement 
that does not represent change. The Gulf Initiative, for them, was merely a 
new mechanism for the re-distribution of power and leverage among the 
old political, tribal and military power centers in Yemen.86  
After the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) initiative, the last hope of a civilized 
state was lost by the South, and Al-Hirak was the only choice for them to go to.  
The Arab Spring introduced a new technique Al-Hirak used to legitimize the 
movement and use religion to gain more supporters—The Friday sermon (Jumaʿa 
Khutba). The Jumaʿa Khutba began demonstrating in the streets and was very famous 
during the Arab Spring in Yemen and other countries. Therefore, when the Arab Spring’s 
Khutba declined, Al-Hirak continued using Jumaʿa Khutbas to support its cause. 
Al-Hirak Al-Janubi’s activists may take credit for inspiring the other revolutions 
in Tunisia and Egypt, and claim they started their peaceful revolution earlier than any 
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other uprising in the Arab world. Stephen Day also asserts that, “the popular uprisings 
that came as a surprise in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Syria, were already well underway 
in Yemen.”87 
D. REPRESSION OF AL-HIRAK  
Repression is a two edges sword, and a user of repression should be a master in its 
techniques. A mistake in any action can provide a huge push to the movement, instead of 
affecting it. Unfortunately, the Yemeni government is implementing unstudied repression 
plans. Therefore, instead of compromising Al-Hirak, the Yemeni Government repressions 
provided political opportunities to the movement that made it even stronger. Unscientific 
repression plans have contributed to the establishment of the movement, justified its 
goals and actions, and supported its causes and narratives.  
Repression, based on Tilly’s definition, is "any action by another group which 
raises the contender’s cost of collective action."88 For the sake of understanding the 
effects of repression as a political opportunity, the author will describe the coercion 
dimension and ignore the channeling dimension because channeling is not easy to 
observe or measure. 
1. Observable Coercive Repression 
a. State Agents Tightly Connected with National Political Elites 
Both Al-Hirak and the Yemeni government were familiar with the 
observable coercion that was implemented by the national security agents. In the South 
after 1986, the socialist party, especially the Tughma, practiced murder and disappearing 
techniques against the Zumra.89 Active political figures disappeared as soon as their 
activities threatened the other side. Some of those individuals’ fate was unknown until 
recently. Before 1994, as a result of tension between the GPC and Al-Islah on one side, 
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and the YSP on the other, political assassinations, kidnapping, and planned car accidents 
happened almost every day.90 This type of repression did not stop after the civil war.  
According to the Southern case team’s report, the government in Sanaʿa 
continued its prisoning, torturing, and enforced disappearances of South activists 
throughout the period from 1994 to 2011.91 Repression was extended to the media side as 
an attempt to contain the movement. According to the Human Rights Watch report, “On 
May 4, 2009, the Ministry of Information suspended eight daily and weekly independent 
newspaper publications over coverage they had given to events in the South.”92 May 
2009 also witnessed the creation of a new court that began trying journalists over the next 
two months.93 
At the time of Al-Hirak’s initiation, the Yemeni government conducted 
several arrests of the movement’s field leaders. Arrested individuals were treated as 
criminals and called “sick” (“amrath”).94 Hasan Baum, along with twelve leaders of the 
movement, was arrested in April 2008 for six months.95 He was released and arrested 
again, and released after the Arab Spring. Hasan Benan, Abdurabu Muhriq, and Khaled 
Manaʿ are activists in Al-Hirak and are in the government prisons.96 The arrests of Naser 
Alnuba, Muhsen Alyazidi, Hassan Baum, and journalist Ahmed Umar ben Faried sparked 
a huge demonstration in Al-dhalʿ in 2007; these arrests were condemned and considered 
a barbaric action that cannot be done by a government.97 “They drew more attention to 
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the rapidly evolving protest movement, as more citizens began participating in daily sit-
ins and rallies.”98 Al-Hirak still demands the releases of their leaders and individuals who 
disappeared since 1994, or were arrested during the rise of the movement for political 
reasons. Even those with criminal charges were considered political prisoners.  
When arrested, Al-Hirak political leaders have received more support and 
become symbols for the movement to rally around their release. Al-Hirak benefits not 
only from the arrests, but from the release of their activists. For example, when Al-Hirak 
activist, Fares Al-dhaleʿi, was released, Al-Hirak celebrated the release by conducting 
demonstrations to show its ability to coerce the government.99 However, although 
observable coercion is a tactic both Al-Hirak and the government have mastered, they do 
not rely on it much due to huge media intervention, the United Nations Human Rights 
Organization, and national and international Non-Governmental Organizations’ (NGOs) 
involvement in internal conflicts.  
b. State Agents Loosely Connected with National Political Elites 
The Yemeni government and most of Yemeni society used to treat 
separatists as criminals. The government took extreme measures to suppress the 
movement such as blocking and disrupting Al-Hirak demonstrations with police and 
military forces.100 According to the Human Rights Watch, “The security forces, and 
central security in particular, have carried out widespread abuses in the South—unlawful 
killings, arbitrarily detentions, beatings, crackdowns on freedom of assembly and speech, 
arrests of journalists”101 The Yemen Observatory on Human Rights “(YOHR) report 
cataloged 623 peaceful protests between January and mid-November 2008 . . . the 
number of protractors killed (7), injured (75), and arrested (860). These numbers mean 
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that each time security forces physically intervened; they arrest more than 10 percent of 
the protestors.”102 However, according to Day,  
A turning point came on the eve of the country’s October 14 holiday, 
which commemorates the start of South Yemen’s revolt against British 
[occupation] in the 1960s. Security forces shot and killed four young men 
in the same street where British Colonial soldiers had killed seven 
Yemenis on October 14, 1963. This echo of violence and oppression from 
more revolutionary times, ignited massive anti-government protests across 
the South and Saleh was powerless to stop them.103 
This type of repression has not always been consistent. Sometimes, police forces attempt 
to control Al-Hirak demonstrations with aggressive measures. At other times, the 
government has no reaction at all to the same type of demonstrations.  
Implementing aggressive measures or having no measures at all are 
dangerous actions, and represent a government with no strategy. When taking aggressive 
measures, the government is hurting the protesters and their families, including those who 
are not core members of Al-Hirak. As a result, Al-Hirak has gained more sympathizers 
and been able to recruit more supporters. “Very aggressive measures increase bitterness 
and alienation among Southerners, who say the North economically exploits and 
politically marginalizes them,” 104 and gives Al-Hirak’s narratives more credibility. On 
the other hand, lack of measures against demonstrations support Al-Hirak by showing 
how strong the movement has become. Then Al-Hirak is strong in the eyes of the 
Southern people. This also enables Al-Hirak to recruit more supporters. 
Even when a professional security force attempts to disperse 
demonstrations, it creates more tension and new supporters for a movement. This tension 
has become worse with the Yemeni government and Al-Hirak. The Yemeni security 
forces are less professional and less disciplined. The Human Rights Watch claims that “in 
its six protests investigated in depth by Human Rights Watch, Yemeni Security Forces 
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violated almost every aspect of [international] standards.”105 Therefore, their acts benefit 
Al-Hirak for sure. In fact, Al-Hirak benefits more from government coercion than it does 
form its resources and structure.  
c. Private Agents 
During 2007 to 2009, “the central government helped establish 
committees to protect the unity, and groups of pro-unity supporters—some of them 
armed—who have carried out armed attacks on unsuspecting Southern activists.”106  
Lately, Al-islah, despite being accused of supporting Al-Hirak before and during the 
Arab Spring, has established itself as a private agent for the Yemeni government to 
suppress Al-Hirak social movement. On March18, the Al-islah party called its supporters 
from the Southern part of the country, reinforced by party members from the North, to 
conduct a demonstration on Aden in favor of unity. Al-Islah wanted to show its ability to 
control the South and show the world that supporters of unity in the South are as many as 
Al-Hirak supporters.  
Understanding the effect on their cause, Al-Hirak leaders condemned the 
attempt even before it occurred. Al-Hirak factions announced their willingness to 
demonstrate on the same day at the same place.107 The Yemeni government remained 
normal and did not interfere with the demonstration, but also did not stop it despite the 
fact that clashes were expected between the two sides. On that day, thousands of people 
moved to Aden from both Al-Islah (unity supporters) and Al-Hirak (separation 
supporters). Clashes were observed, and casualties from both sides were recorded. 
Security forces were accused of supporting the unity demonstrations lead by Al-Islah. 
The government was complicit with Al-islah’s attempt to suppress Al-
Hirak using the same techniques Al-Hirak used; however, the confrontation had negative 
consequences for both the government and Al-Islah party. The outcome of demonstration 
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and clashes was in favor of Al-Hirak, who reacted aggressively by burning several Islah 
offices in Aden, Hadramout, and Shabwah.108 Al-Islah and the GPC condemned each 
other’s actions regardless of whether they were right or wrong, and who supported other 
movements like Al-Hirak and al-Houthies. The GPC took advantage of the Al-Islah 
involvement in this demonstration, and criticized it in its media, portraying Al-Hirak 
supporters as victims. Al-Hirak appeared stronger after this action, and a new window 
was opened for Al-Hirak to justify the use of violence under a self-defense slogan. 
2. Unobserved Coercive Repression 
Unobserved coercion is relatively safe compared to observed coercion. The 
Yemeni government’s unobserved actions benefited the unity government to an extent, 
because it was implementing unobservable actions that benefited the state; however, 
sometimes these actions benefited Al-Hirak even more due to their unintended effects.  
a. State Agents Tightly Connected with National Political Elites 
On the bright side, the political security bureau and national security 
bureau were very active in Yemen. They were aware of the Al-Hirak movement activities 
and knew its effective leaders. After the leadership change, the national security bureau 
regained its good reputation of being a tool in the hand of the government, instead of the 
regime. Among Al-Hirak members, there were accusations of each being proxies for the 
unity government. The mistrust between Al-Hirak leaders and members was considered a 
product of the national security involvement. It was next to impossible to measure the 
outcomes of the national security involvement because of its nature of secrecy.   
On the negative side, political and national security bureaus’ actions 
opened opportunities for Al-Hirak to coerce the people of the South. Unity supporters 
were treated as traders or agents of these bureaus. This hindered the government attempts 
to gain public support in the South. During the Southern movement, the Southern people 
could choose to be with Al-Hirak or they could be proxies for the political and national 
bureaus. 
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b. Private Agents 
To Al-Hirak members, people who supported unity or acted in favor of the 
government—or even worked for the public administration—were considered agents of 
the government. There were many uneducated individuals who thought they represented 
the country and felt it was a legitimate duty to speak on its behalf. However, they did not 
know how to handle a discussion with separation supporters. They attacked the 
separatists with obscene words and were unable to distinguish the separatists in the South 
from Al-Hirak activists. Consequently, they attacked all Southern people.  Collectively, 
Southerners felt closer to Al-Hirak than to the unity movement, even though they 
supported the unification of the country.  
Al-Hirak exploited the acts of uneducated individuals, especially when 
they held positions in the public administration or represented known political parties.109 
Therefore, any harm to a Southern individual inflicted by an individual from the North or 
an employee of the government was considered an attack by an occupation force against 
poor Southern people. Al-Hirak was building its separatist narrative on behaviors of 
individuals who spoke on behalf of the government or unity, when in fact, they only 
represented themselves. 
                                                 
.109 Aidaruos Nasr Naser, “Defenders of Yemeni Unity,” Mareb Press (September 16, 2012), 
http://mail.marebpress.com/articles.php?id=17308&lng=arabic. 
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IV. MOBILIZING STRUCTURE 
A. LEADERSHIP 
Al-Hirak began as an unstructured movement without recognized leadership,110 
but had no problem finding charismatic leaders. Leaders who governed the South prior to 
reunification, and those who declared separation in 1994, are still leading Al-Hirak Al-
Janubi today. They provide guidance and leadership, and also legitimize the movement 
by being the ones who, in the eyes of some Southern citizens, are the legitimate leaders of 
the South. One of Al-Hirak’s narratives is that all other Arab Spring revolutions existed 
to get rid of their leaders, while the Al-Hirak revolution came to bring back its 
leadership.111  
Some of Al-Hirak’s leaders were inside the country, and some lead remotely from 
exile. For example, Ali Salem Al-Beedh was the president of PDRY since 1986, the vice 
president of RoY from 1990 to 1994, and he declared himself again as the president of 
the South during the two months of 1994 civil war. Ali Nasser Mohammed was the 
president of PDRY form 1980 until he fled to Northern Yemen in 1986. In 1990, he was 
relocated to exile to set the stage for unity as part of political agreement between the 
North and the South.112 He reestablished his connections in Yemen after 2006, when he 
realized that Sanaʿa was becoming weak. Haidar Al-Addas, the federalism admirer, was 
the prime minister in both the PDRY and RoY until 1994. Abdurrahman Al-Jefry 
(president of Sons of Yemen League Party) was famous for his strictness against unity 
and his ability to influence the business people outside Yemen to gain their financial 
support. All of the leaders mentioned above were symbolic exiled leaders; each one has 
his own proxies who represent his views, follow his orders, and receive his support.  
                                                 
.110 Brehony, Yemeni Divided: The Story of a Failed State in South Arabia, 210. 
.111 This is a widespread narrative used by Southern people, especially those who support Ali Salem 
Al-Beedh. I hear it whenever we discuss the relationship between Al-Hirak Youth and the old leadership 
with Southern individuals who support separation. 
.112 Ali Abdullah Saleh, “Al-Thakirah Al-Siasiah,” Sanaʿa: Al Arabia News Channel (June 21, 2013). 
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On the ground, Al-Hirak had well-known leadership that represented its different 
factions. Although Al-Hirak started as a retired military officer’s movement with retired 
military leaders like Nasser Al-Nubah, other leaders jumped into the movement when the 
movement took the path toward separation. Among those leaders were: Hassan Baoum, 
who sits against Ali Salem Al-Beedh; Mohammed Ali Ahmad who participated on the 
NDC; Al-Hasani who was the commander of the navy until 2007 when he was forced to 
retire; Ali Haitham Algharīb the councilor for political affair of the Supreme Council of 
the peaceful movement for the liberation of the South; Qasim ʿAskar; Abdulhamid 
Shukri; Sheikh Hasan Benan of Hatm faction; Ali Naser Al-Shaibah from Abyan; Sheikh 
Saleh Ben Farid Al-ʿAulaqi from Sahbwah; Ali Ben Ali Shukri from Aden; Salah Al-
Shunfuri from Aldal’a; former Al-Qaeda member Tareq Al-Fadli from Abyan; and 
others. Ali Salem Albeedh’s appearance had marginalized most of the existing domestic 
leaders. Alasrar asserts that, “The movement’s core leadership, which consisted of 
esteemed figures with fresh portfolios, such as Hassan Ba’aum, and Nasser al-Nouba, 
was completely overshadowed by the power and influence of the former, older, Southern 
leadership.”113 
Politically and financially, exiled leaders were critical of the movement. 
However, leaders on the ground participated in Al-Hirak demonstrations, coordinated its 
movement and programs, and spoke on its behalf to support the exiled leaders or 
marginalize them. On July 7, 2013, demonstrations were called by Baum to gather in 
Mukkala, Hadramout. What was new about it was its loyalty to Hassan Baum and not Ali 
Salem Al-Beedh. It repeated slogans like “No leadership after today, our leader is Hassan 
Baoum” (La Qiadah Baʿd alyoum, Gaidna Hassan Baoum).114 Operationally, the 
movement would not survive without leaders on the ground who were charismatic, smart, 
and willing to face the government for their cause. Leaders on the ground had the 
advantage of credibility in the eyes of their supporters, while leaders who lived outside 
                                                 
.113 Fatima Abo Alasrar, “Saving South Yemen from Itself,” Forging Policy (May 7, 2013) 
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Yemen had the advantages of history and money, which was very important to sustain the 
movement. Ali Salem owned the main television channel that called for separation, which 
he acquired to support those who supported him. 
The only weakness within the Southern movement leadership is the disagreement 
between their different factions, which affects the overall legitimacy of movement’s 
cause. Nicole Stracke and Haidar assert, “Most of the groups involved in separatist 
activities work independently and often in competition with each other. In fact, the 
movement is characterized by deep divisions as the leadership of each group tries to 
impose its own agenda.”115 Al-Hirak lacks a unified leadership116 and “it is unlikely that 
there is a single over-arching leadership body.”117 Leaders of Al-Hirak have no problem 
declaring their hatred and mistrust of each other. They have “failed to overcome their 
past differences and found it difficult to make their voice heard.”118 For example, when 
Hassan Baum called for demonstrations in Mukalla to celebrate the Southern calamity on 
July 7, Ali Salem Al-Beeth called for civil disobedience against these demonstrations.119 
Andrew Engel, “[Al-Hirak’s] leadership is fractured among domestic and exiled figures, 
with [many] different councils claiming to speak for it.”120 Susanne Dahlgren also 
asserts, “The Southern movement has no national leadership or joint organization and 
locally takes a variety of forms.”121 This describes how the exiled and local leaders were 
able to agree upon one thing and disagree upon many others. Today, unity still enjoys 
critical support from strong leaders in the South. 
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B. RESOURCE MOBILIZATION 
Al-Hirak relied heavily upon specific areas and specific ages for human 
mobilization. As one religious woman asserts, “the main body of Al-Hirak are the youth 
of unity meaning those who were born after 1990,”122 because, unlike old and 
experienced men and women, youth did not see the problems of separation in both the 
North and the South, they only saw the problems they had. Youth are convinced that, 
after separation, they will get to live a decent life. Leaders of Al-Hirak rely for support on 
youth who do not know the history of those leaders. However, although history is bad for 
the youth to know, it is good for the old who belong to the Tughma group,123 which helps 
sustain the flow of the movement, regardless of a president who is from the South but 
from the Zumra group. Initially, the movement relied on the tribal areas (Al-Dalea, for 
example) that were from the Tughma, and ruled the country from 1986 to 1994 until the 
Zumra, supported by the unity army, defeated them and confiscated their homes and 
lands.124  
The saying “money talks and everyone has a price,” can tell how important 
financing is for social movements to survive. From 2007, Al-Hirak used to pay 2000 YR 
daily for those who participated in demonstrations.125 If the regulars who participated in 
occasional demonstrations got this amount of money daily, middle leaders and activists 
supposedly got more than that. Therefore, financing was the blood of Al-Hirak, who 
could live only with enough of it on hand.  
In terms of financial resources, Al-Hirak relied mainly on the outside support of 
Yemeni businessmen in Gulf countries, Europe, and the United States. According to one 
of the movement’s local leaders, Salah Alshunfrah, the main resources of Al-Hirak was 
not external support. Al-Hirak depended upon 100 YR (47 cents) that was contributed by 
                                                 
.122 Afaq Al-Hiwar, Yemen channel, http://www.yemen-tv.net/media/index.php?mod=items&cid=15. 
.123 After the 1986 crises in the Southern part of the country, the two sides of the conflict were called 
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.124 “Breaking Point? Yemen’s Southern Question,” Middle East Report No. 114, International Crisis 
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.125 An officer in the special forces who is from the South described the way Al-Hirak support the 
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each member through donations for the injured persons, and businessmen inside and 
outside Yemen.126 However, unconfirmed reports mentioned relationships between Iran 
and some of the movement’s leaders, especially Ali Salem Al-Beedh.  
Regional players fought against each other in Yemen. For example, Saudi Arabia 
and Iran supported each other’s enemies, regardless of who was right and who was 
wrong.127 In the case of Al-Hirak, it was in Iran’s interest to support the weakening of the 
Yemeni government and open a political space for Al-Houthies in the North. However, 
there is no evidence about the strength, type, character, or relationship between Al-Hirak, 
Iran, and Saudi Arabia.  
C. FACTIONS OF THE MOVEMENT 
Al-Hirak is known for having a mixed structure and organization. It has a 
charismatic centralized leadership and works in factions at the same time. It is called Al-
Hirak (the moving), not Harakah (movement), which explains the kind of structure it 
contains. As mentioned in the crisis group’s report, “The Hirak is a loosely organized 
popular movement, internally diverse and fluid, that houses a number of important 
historical, regional and ideological trends.”128 It consists of “various locally and 
regionally organized groups that loosely coordinate their activities, but often act 
independently.”129 Therefore, it has many factions. Some factions agree on the end state 
and disagree on the means, other factions agree on the means but disagree on the end 
state, and some disagree on both the means and the end state.  
Al-Hirak Al-Janubi is a set of individuals who lead and represent their tribal 
clans, previous political affiliation, and military position. It is divided between radicals 
who want separation and accept dialogue only under international supervision to reach an 
agreement with the government, and moderates who seek solutions to their people’s 
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grievances under the unity umbrella. In turn, the radicals are divided between extreme 
radicals who call for an armed resistance, and others who call for peaceful resistance like 
demonstrations and civil disobedience.  The most extreme and strongest faction is led by 
retired military officers who know nothing but fighting and are supported by Ali Salem 
al-Beedh. Other factions that ask for civil disobedience are led by Abu Baker Aladdas, 
Ali Naser Mohammed, Hassan Baum, and Mohammed Ali Ahmed. The current 
leadership of the YSP is less extreme and demands solutions to the Southern people’s 
grievances under a united government. 
Al-Hirak factions vertically and horizontally intersect with each other on their 
goals, leaders, and active members. They move like thick water from side-to-side, joining 
one another at times, and leaving one faction to join another at other times, according to 
situations, resources, and leadership.  The following section explains the main factions of 
Al-Hirak or, what we may call, Al-Hirak Al-Janubi’s network structure: 
1. The Supreme Council of the Peaceful Movement for the Liberation of 
the South (Al-Majlis Al-AʿLa Lilhirak Al-Selmi Letahrir Al-Janub) 
The Supreme Council of the Peaceful Movement for the Liberation of the South 
(Al-majlis Al-aʿla lilhirak al-selmi letahrir al-janub) is the largest component of the Al-
Hirak and was established in May 2009. It is very popular in all the provinces of the 
South, and its leaders have political and social weight in the South, as well as at home 
and abroad. It depends on businessmen from Gulf countries and some expatriates for 
financial support, as well as from international funding indirectly and non-exposed.130 It 
is predominantly led by Ali Salem Albeedh from exile, and Hassan Baum in Yemen, and 
relies upon other sub-leaders like Salah Alshunfura, Abdullah Mahdi, Ali al-Saadi, Qasim 
Aldaara, Saleh Abdel Haq, Ali Al-Bishi, and Nasser Al-Tawil. 
This faction is witnessing variations, significantly between those who embrace 
independence and separation, as well as, disengagement from the North, who consider 
the South an occupied territory. The most prominent leader of this trend, Hassan Baum, is 
also the most popular and most influential. The Shallal Ali Shaiaʿ parliament member, 
                                                 
.130 Saleh Al-Jabwani, “The Iranian Money Consequences on the Southern Revolution,” Muntada Al-
Hirak Al-Janubi (July 7, 2013),  http://aden11.com/vb/showthread.php?t=33816. 
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Nasser Al-Khabji, has great supporters as well. Others are calling for the federal system 
(two regions within the framework of the federal state), to the people of the South with 
the option of a referendum for free self-determination.  Among those who embrace the 
federal system are the first unity government prime minister Haidar Abu Bakr Al-Attas, 
and the former President of the South, Ali Nasser Mohammed. However, both seem to be 
more independent in their actions from this faction, and also have independent 
supporters.  
2. National Council  of Al-Hirak: The National Council to Return the 
National Nation (Al-Majlis Al-Watani listiʿAdat Dawlat Al-Janub)  
The National Council to Return the National Nation, led by Abdul Hamid Shukri 
and Amin Saleh, was strong at the grassroots level. However, currently, most of its 
leaders have joined the leader Ali Salem’s faction, which has weakened it significantly. 
3. The National Commission for the Southern Movement and the 
Retired Military Officers Committee (Almajlis Alwatni Lelhirak Al-
Janubi and Jamiat al-MutagaʿIdin al-Janubiien) 
Although Brigadier Nasser Al-Nuba and Brigadier General (retired) Nasser Al-
Tawil have established (within the Retired Military Officers Committee) the root of Al-
Hirak, this faction has become one of the weakest components, as it is confined to some 
events in the province of Shabwa and AdDali’, with some activities in the governorates 
of Abyan and Hadramaut.131 However, some of the Southern leaders succeeded in 
attracting this faction’s activities to Aden. For example, Al-Nuba was supported by Ali 
Salem’s faction in breaking the civil disobedience in Aden; however, at the same time, 
was denied access to the stage to speak, which brought tensions between the two factions. 
Today, while Al-Nuba retains the symbolic leadership of this faction, he works mainly on 
the side of Hassan Baum with the Supreme Council of the peaceful movement for the 
liberation of the South.  
                                                 
.131 Stracke and Haidar, “The Southern Movement in Yemen.” 
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4. Youth and Student Movement (Harakat Al-Shabab Waltullab Al-
Janubiin) 
The Youth and Student Movement exists heavily in the province of Aden, but is 
also present in almost all Southern governorates. It is led by Fadi Hassan Baum, Ali 
Abdulrab, and AbdelFattah al-Rubaie, and is a suite of the wings of the Supreme Council 
for Peaceful Movement leader Hassan Baoum (Fadi’s Father). This movement was 
intended to contain the youth anger through some activities, media presence, and good 
communication via social networking sites.   
5. South Youth Federation (Ittihad Shabab Al-Janub) 
The South Youth Federation is one of Al-Hirak Al-Janubi’s weakest factions. Its 
leaders, Ali Al-Saiia, Wajdi ShuʿAybi, and Anwar Ismail, broke away from the Al-Beedh 
movement. It is characterized by its adoption of the establishment of the so-called State 
of South Arabia. 
6. The Movement of the People of the South (Southern Democratic 
Congress Tajj) (Harakat Tajj) 
Tajj was established and officially announced in July 2004.132 Jalab ‘Ubadi was 
the exiled leader of the Tajj, and Saleh Al-Yafi’ was his deputy and local leader. Main 
members were Al-Khader Al-Hassani, Abdu Al-Nakieb, and sub-leaders Abdullah 
Abdulsamad and Fadl Alhaj from England, Ahmed Muthanna and Fadl Alisaʿ from the 
U.S., Mohammad Almas from Sweden, and Badr Alsalahi from the Arabian Gulf. So far, 
this faction exists only in the media, and does not have a presence in the field.  This 
movement had strong ties with the Supreme Council of the Peaceful Movement for the 
Liberation of the South;133 however, in the first week of May 2013, the Tajj leadership 
met in Cairo134 to discuss changing its way of activities, according to the new 
leadership’s affiliation and situations on the ground. 
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7. Youth February 16 (Shabab 16 Febrair) 
The Youth February 16 was one of the Arab Spring creations, and has a known 
leader, Hasan ben Shuʿaib. It started as a movement to change the regime in Sanaʿa under 
the same slogan “Al-shaʿab yurid isqad al-nitham;” however, it deviated to become one 
of the separatist factions.  What is significant about the group is its use of religions 
leaders to justify violent actions against what is called the Northern occupation. It 
participated in blocking streets and damaging some interests of Northern businessmen in 
Aden. This faction tends to not reveal its leaders and members. It seems to be a shadow 
for other bigger factions in the movement.  
8. The Movement for Self-Determination HATAM (Haraka Taqreer Al-
Maseer) 
HATAM is the oldest faction of the Southern Movement, beginning in 1994 as a 
result of the civil war. It targets security check points, some security institutions, and 
assassinations of military officers.135 Ali Salem Al-Beedh adapted the movement 
recently, along with its leaders Shaikh Hassan Banan, and Abdulfattah Al-Rubaiʿi, who 
are affiliated with the Supreme Council and Ali Salem. HATAM is considered to be the 
symbol of the Southern revolution against what is called the Yemeni occupation.  
9. The Southern Nation National Congress (Almutamar Al-Wattani 
LishaʿB Aljanub) 
The Southern Nation National Congress represents the people who accepted and 
participated in the NDC. Its leaders Ahmed Al-Surimah, Mohammed Ali Ahmed, and 
Yasin Umar Makkawi, represent Al-Hirak on the NDC in Sanaʿa. However, Ahmed Al- 
Suraimah withdrew on from the NDC on May 1, 2013, and accused those who stayed as 
traders. Mohammed Ali Ahmed is now the leader, along with Yasin Umar Makkawi, who 
was nominated as the NDC President Deputy by the President of Yemen.136 
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D. ANALYSIS OF AL-HIRAK AL-JANUBI NETWORK, FACTIONS, 
RELATIONSHIPS, AND INFLUENTIAL LEADERS  
To provide an analytical description of the movement’s mobilization structure, 
three forms of analysis available in Palantir’s visual analytic program were used. These 
forms are Link Analysis, Social Network Analysis (SNA), and Geospatial Analysis. The 
focus of the analysis is toward factions of al-Hirak’s network as units of analysis in order 
to understand each faction’s strength relative to other factions. It also analyzes 
individuals that lead those factions to measure their level of influence. 
Figure 1 illustrates the Al-Hirak Al-Janubi social movement’s anarchic structure. 
The relationship and links indicate that the movement is horizontal and divided, however, 
related to each other in some way or another. Figure 2 shows different entities like 
factions (shown in blue), locations (shown in yellow) that accommodate Al-Hirak, known 
active members (shown in green), and events (shown in black) based on available open 
source data.  
 
 
Figure 1.   Al-Hirak Al-Janubi’s Network. 
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1.  Link Analysis 
The link analysis in Figure 2 illustrates the influential agents of each faction and 




Figure 2.   Influential Actors’ Network Relationships.   
Based on link analysis as shown in Figure 2, Ali Salem Al-Beedh is the most 
influential individual with 21 links to factions and other activists with a lead type of 
relationship, followed by Hassan Baum who has 11 links. Hassan Baum is the most 
influential leader on the ground and is considered a legitimate leader of the local 
movement among many activists. In addition, Ali Salem Al-Beedh and Hassan Baum are 
mostly linked by a relationship to the Supreme Council of the Peaceful Movement for the 
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Liberation of the South. Ali Nasser Mohamed and Haider al Addas are ranked third with 
10 links. While both are considered active leaders in the movement, Haider al Addas, 
located in Saudi Arabia, has an advantage of relationship with more business 
organizations.  
Figure 3 shows that The Supreme Council of The Peaceful Movement for the 
Liberation of the South has more links than other factions. Links relationships can be 
seen in membership, components or branches, sub groups, and affiliations with other 
factions or activists. Interestingly enough, the Movement of the People of the South 
(Southern Democratic Congress Tajj) (Harakat Tajj) ranks second in affiliation and 
relationships, which can be explained by its bases outside Yemen and dependency on 
activities and other factions in Yemen. Youth and Student Movement (Harakat Al-





Figure 3.   The Supreme Council of the Peaceful Movement for the Liberation of the 
South Links. 
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In terms of appearances, the Movement of the People of the South (Southern 
Democratic Congress Tajj) (Harakat Tajj) appears in six locations, mostly countries 
outside Yemen; while inside Yemen, the Youth and Student Movement (Harakat Al-
Shabab Waltullab Al-Janubiin) appears in six cities, namely, Sabuah, Lahj, Abian, Ad 
Dali, Hadramaut and Aden. The Movement for Self-Determination HATAM (Haraka 
Taqreer Al-Maseer) appears in five governorates: Lahj, Hadramaut, Ad Dali, Abyan, and 
Aden while the rest of the factions are dispersed in four or fewer governorates.   
The only faction that has a relatively hierarchal structure with components or 
branches in all main six governorates of southern Yemen is The Supreme Council of the 
Peaceful Movement for the Liberation of the South. It has branches in Shabuah, Aden, 
Ad Dali, Haramaut, Lahj, Abyan and even in Soqatrah island. Besides, the Supreme 
Council of the Peaceful Movement for the Liberation of the South has high number of 
membership relative to other factions. It has 23 active leaders attached to the 
headquarters of the organization and an average of six active leaders for each branch, 
while other factions have active members in different locations or governorates without 
formal components or branches. Therefore, link analysis shows that the general pattern of 
the Southern separatist movement is centered around The Supreme Council of the 
Peaceful Movement for the Liberation of the South and has four influential leaders that 
have ties with most factions and activists of the movement. 
2.  Social Network Analysis (SNA) 
To take our analysis a step farther than only the number of links a faction or an 
individual has, we implemented a Social Network Analysis to measure significance of 
each faction. Four SNA measurements were applied to the movement’s factions in one 
mode analysis. Individuals and entities other than factions were excluded to purify the 
results and ensure that the relative degrees of all types of centralities are not influenced 




 Betweenness centrality measures the extent to which a faction lies on the 
shortest paths between all other actors in a network. Thus, it captures the 
ability of a faction to control the flow of information and other resources 
through a network. 
 Closeness centrality that measures the average distance from the measured 
faction to all other factions in the network.   
 Degree centrality that measures a faction’s relative importance in the graph in 
terms of its number of ties.  
 Eigenvector centrality, the more significant form of measurement in SNA, that 
assumes that ties to highly central actors are more important than ties to 
peripheral actors. Thus, an actor’s eigenvector centrality is its summed 
connections to others, weighted by their centrality scores.  
Table 1 summarizes the rank of factions corresponding to the four measurements 
of centrality. Note that each color in the table represents a faction, and the numbers 
shown in parentheses the raw value in centrality measurement.  
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Betweeness Centrality Closeness Centrality Degree Centrality Eigenvector 
Centrality 
The Supreme Council of the 
Peaceful Movement for the 
Liberation of the South  
= (126.5) 
The Supreme Council of the 
Peaceful Movement for the 
Liberation of the South 
= (0.8) 
The Supreme Council of 
the Peaceful Movement 
for the Liberation of the 
South  
= (23) 
The Supreme Council 
of the Peaceful 
Movement for the 
Liberation of the South  
= (0.13) 
The Council of the Peaceful 
Movement to Liberate the 
South (Success)  
= (43.5) 
The Council of the Peaceful 
Movement to Liberate the 
South (Success)  
= (0.7) 
 ةيبابشلا ةكرحلل يلعلاا سلجملا




 = (18) 
 ةيبابشلا ةكرحلل يلعلاا سلجملا





ةكرحلل يلعلاا سلجملا  ةيبابشلا





 ةيبابشلا ةكرحلل يلعلاا سلجملا





The Council of the 
Peaceful Movement to 
Liberate the South 
(Success)  
= (18) 
The Council of the 
Peaceful Movement to 
Liberate the South 
(Success) 
= (0.10) 
The Movement of the People 
of the South (Southern 
Democratic Congress Tajj) 
(Harakat Tajj) 
= (23) 
National Council of Al-
Hirak: The National Council 
to Return the National 
Nation (Al-Majlis Al-Watani 
listiʿAdat  Dawlat Al-Janub) 
= (0.63) 
The Supreme Council (Al 
Dali’a Branch) 
= (11) 
The Supreme Council 
(Al Dali’a Branch) 
= (0.06) 
Yemen Socialist Party 
= (23) 
The Higher National Forum 








 = (11) 





National Council of Al-
Hirak: The National Council 
to Return the National Nation 
(Al-Majlis Al-Watani 
listiʿAdat Dawlat Al-Janub) 
= (13.9) 
The Movement for Self-
Determination HATAM 
(Haraka Taqreer Al-Maseer) 
= (0.58) 
National Council of Al-
Hirak: The National 
Council to Return the 




National Council of Al-
Hirak: The National 






Table 1. Summary of SNA on Al-Hirak Al-Janubi Factions – Top 10. 
 
It can be seen in Table 1 that The Supreme Council of the Peaceful Movement for 
the Liberation of the South has the highest centrality on all types of centrality. The 
Council of the Peaceful Movement to Liberate the South (Success) and Youth and 
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Student Movement (Harakat Al-Sahbab Waltullab Al-Janubiin) are alternating between 
second and third importance in four measurements of centrality.  The Council of the 
Peaceful Movement to Liberate the South (Success) is seen as the previous version of 
The Supreme Council of the Peaceful Movement for the Liberation of the South, and the 
Youth and Student Movement (Harakat Al-Sahbab Waltullab Al-Janubiin) is, in fact, the 
Youth branch of The Supreme Council of the Peaceful Movement for the Liberation of 
the South. However, the Youth movement is more important as it has higher eigenvector 
centrality, which means it is more closely connected to other important factions of the 
movement including The Supreme Council of the Peaceful Movement for the Liberation 
of the South. These three factions have dominated the potential of brokers and bridges; 
direct and indirect influence; the dissemination of information and involvement of 
activities within the network.   
Table 2 shows the overall rank of factions in all SNA centrality measures. 
 









The Supreme Council of the 
Peaceful Movement for the 
Liberation of the South 
1 1 1 1 
 
First 
Youth and Student Movement 
(Harakat Al-Sahbab Waltullab 
Al-Janubiin) 
3 3 2 2 
 
Second 
The Council of the Peaceful 
Movement to Liberate the 
South (Success) 
2 2 3 3 
 
Third 
The Movement for Self-
Determination HATAM (Haraka 
Taqreer Al-Maseer) 
8 - 5 5 
 
Forth 
The National Council to Return 
the National Nation (Al-Majlis 
Al-Watani listiʿAdat  Dawlat Al-
Janub) 
6 4 6 6 
 
Fifth 
Table 2. Top 6 Al-Hirak Faction Performances in Centrality Measurements. 
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The analysis shows that Supreme Council of the Peaceful Movement for the 
Liberation of the South is the most significant faction of the movement. It ranks first in 
all degrees of centralities. The Youth and Student Movement (Harakat Al-Sahbab 
Waltullab Al-Janubiin) is second in overall degrees centrality, and The Council of the 
Peaceful Movement to Liberate the South (Success) is third. The Movement for Self-
Determination HATAM (Haraka Taqreer Al-Maseer) ranks fourth followed by The 
National Council to Return the National Nation (Al-Majlis Al-Watani listiʿAdat  Dawlat 
Al-Janub). Therefore, overall link and SNA centralities analyses conclude that the 
Supreme Council of the Peaceful Movement for the Liberation of the South is the most 
central and influential faction in the movement. 
3.  Geospatial Analysis 
In terms of geospatial analysis (see Figure 4), the movement is primarily present 
in the southwest part of Yemen, especially Aden, Lahj, Abyan, Syabwah, and Ad Dali 
governorates as compared to Hadramaut and al Mahrah, which are located at the 
southeast of Yemen. 
 
 
Figure 4.   Geospatial Analysis of the Al-Hirak Movement. 
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As Figure 4 shows the Aden governorate has the highest density of the 
movements’ presence. Therefore, it is the most important governorate for the movement 
activities. In the northern part of Yemen the movement seems to have a lesser or 
insignificant presence. Although Figure 4 shows presence of the movement in 
governorates’ centers and suggests that the movement’s presence is concentrated as 
indicated by hotpoints, the movement’s presence is dispersed all over particular 
governorates.  
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V. AL-HIRAK AL-JANUBI’S CULTURAL FRAME AND PUBLIC 
SUPPORT 
A. IDEOLOGICAL PACKAGE AND FRAMING 
According to history, Yemen is a single state.137 From 1960 until 1990, both 
administrations of the North and the South struggled to unite the country. In schools, 
children in Aden and Sanaʿa learned about Yemen as a united county.138 Therefore, 
although the reunification was—like Germany—a product of Cold War termination, it 
represented the peoples’ will in both the North and the South. Trying to create a separatist 
ideology is very difficult for Al-Hirak. In fact, when the movement was sparked in 2007, 
unity was its metaphor.139 Therefore, the movement is relying heavily upon the 
grievances that were produced during and after 1994 civil war. 
1. Ideology 
a. Religion  
In an Islamic society that believes in the Day of Judgment religious 
ideology should be present to overcome all the ethical dilemmas. The side that wins the 
religious justification for its actions wins the hearts and minds of the people who are 
dedicated for the cause. In Yemen, religion is not in favor of separation at all. Therefore, 
there is not a significant or single ideology uniting the Southern movement and providing 
it with public support. Religious figures are struggling to find significant religious 
support for the separationists, because Islam is about unity. Al-Hirak activists realized the 
importance of religion and ideology at the beginning of their struggle. Al-Nuba asserts, 
                                                 
.137 Under his rule, Abu Karib As’ad was able to unify the whole of Southern Arabia from the coast to 
highland. He was thought to have reached Yathrib (Al-Madina Al-Munawwara now in Saudi Arabia). For 
more information, see Alessandro De Maigret, “Arabia Felix: An Exploration of Archaeological History of 
Yemen,” Stacey International, translated by Rebecca Thompson, 2002. 
.138 Hunud Al Fadhli, “Lady of the Fadhli: Unity Remains Forever One that Will Not Be Able To 
Dismember the Yemeni Body,” June 25, 2013, http://yemen-press.com/news20257.html. 
.139 Saut Al-Janub Al-Arabi, SBR, http://www.soutalgnoub.com/vb2/showthread.php?t=7262. 
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“We (Al-Hirak) should have an ideology that defines our country, and defeats their (Al-
islah) ideology.”140 
b. Socialism 
The idea of socialism is active among Al-Hirak activists and some of the 
Southern poor, who depend upon the government for support. The South was governed 
by socialism for more than twenty years, and most of the people were very dependent 
upon the government for support and services. Changing to a capitalist system, especially 
a failed system, encourages people to remember their life before reunification. They were 
very poor people struggling for food and basic services, and differences between social 
classes were almost absent under Socialist rule. Under capitalism, the Southerners are 
still poor, but they are able to see that there are also many rich people, especially the 
Northerners. Poor people are nostalgic for Socialism for economic reasons, while leaders 
of the retired military organizations, retired military officers who were trained in the 
USSR, and Al-Hirak activists, especially ex-leaders of the Socialist party, are missing the 
Socialist system for its philosophy. It had been their religion for many years. Therefore, 
Al-Hirak is benefiting from the Socialist philosophy of economic and caste systems.  
2. Framing of Religion and Socialism 
During the 1994 civil war, the ideology of Jihad worked well for the unity 
government. Being a proxy of the USSR, the Southern separatist government was 
considered to be dominated by non-believers (kuffar) that had to be eliminated. At the 
time of the war, the Southern military did not recognize how important religion was. 
However, Al-Hirak Al-Janubi recognized this early on in its movement; therefore, 
religious figures were utilized to mobilize the people of the South and legitimize the call 
for separation.141 Attacks on the Al-Islah party (that supported Ali Saleh during the civil 
war by providing Jihadists and legitimizing its war) were more prominent. The Al-Hirak 
Al-Janubi movement, by delegitimizing the civil war, was questioning the religious 
                                                 
.140 Al-Ayam Newspaper. 
.141 “New Faction in the South Publicized Soon as the National Islamic Movement of the South,” 
Hadramout Press (August 4, 2013), 
http://www.hadrmoutpress.com/index.php?ac=3&no=6224#sthash.Vu9DDxFr.dpuf. 
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leaders from the North who supported it, to ensure they would not have the same effect if 
another war or dispute occurred.  
To overcome ideology-framing difficulties, Al-Hirak relied upon delegitimizing 
the unity government causes, by exploiting its mistakes and highlighting corruption. Just 
like separatism, corruption is condemned by Islam. Al-Hirak, through its religious 
supporters, attacked the corrupted system in Sanaʿa and sold separation as the only way 
to survive. Al-Hirak printed many pre-unification flags to represent the South and 
changed the name of Southern Yemen to Southern Arabia (Al-Janub Al-Arabi) to 
convince the people that the South was not a part of Yemen at all.  
Although religion was not in favor of Al-Hirak Al-Janubi in its call for separation, 
Al-Hirak had succeeded in using religious ideology to counter the 1994 civil war and 
promote the Northern ideology and unity factions of the movement under one umbrella. 
Socialism, like religious ideology, had limited effects due to the change in the 
international system and the failure of Socialism. Al-Hirak was using Socialism to get 
more supporters, and at the same time, deny any intentions to return to it. 
3. Opportunities in Adaptation 
Although the Al-Hirak leadership was calling for separation of the county as a 
limit to their negotiation with the Yemeni Government, they adapted to the situation. 
During the Arab Spring, Al-Hirak agreed to freeze their call for separation. They 
supported the youth against Ali Saleh because of an agreement between the JMP’s 
leaders and Al-Hirak leaders against a common enemy. This benefited the JMPs by 
unifying all efforts against Saleh, and gave Al-Hirak an opportunity to mobilize its 
supporters untouched. Within the NDC, there were participants of Al-Hirak, who 
continued to call for separation and for a federal system, but they participated in the 
NDC, despite other factions of Al-Hirak’s refusal.  
The Al-Hirak movement relied heavily upon the grievances, unemployment, and 
repression they had experienced over 15 years. In response President Hadi formed a 
committee that looked at the Southern grievances of repression, began receiving their 
claims of stolen lands, and revived occupations they were forced to retired from. At the 
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same time, Hadi was withdrawing the carpet from under Al-Hirak leaders’ feet if the 
committee worked as it should. Therefore, from the leaders of the Al-Hirak 
announcement, there was an adaptation to the situation strategy where they asked for 
separation at times, a federal system other times, and addressed their grievances on many 
occasions, according to the situation and opportunity. Al-Hirak exploited every 
opportunity to sell its narratives and depict the unity government as a Northern 
occupation of the South. Even separatist incidents were politicized to support Al-Hirak’s 
cause; however, the leaders were forced to comply with their young supporters, who were 
convinced that separation was the solution to their problems. 
B. MOTIVATING AND MANIPULATING SUPPORTERS FOR THE  CAUSE 
1. Attraction 
a. Ideological Concept 
Al-Hirak could not rely upon a religious concept to achieve its ultimate 
goal. Southern religious figures were accustomed to attracting new members and 
mobilizing the existing supporters for separation. Al-Hirak leaders were using the Friday 
sermon (khtba) to call for supporters, as an attempt to change the Southerners’ belief in 
unity. Some religious figures justified separation as the only means to end grievances and 
escape from the corruption for which the government in Sanaʿa was famous. However, 
although religion was used to legitimize the movement, religion itself needed justification 
to legitimize its call for separation. In Islam, unity is the norm, and separation is odd; 
therefore, successful, religious concepts can only delegitimize the other religious ideas of 
unity. 
The ideology of Communism was working for those who lost their luxury 
after 1994 and for those who suffered from the corrupt figures in the government. 
However, the main force behind the movement was the resistance against occupation 
ideology that Al-Hirak had put great effort into emphasizing itself as the only supporter 
for the people of the South, and the only choice to end their grievances. 
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b. Social Services  
Citizens in the South looked to the government to provide them with 
social services. The Yemeni government controlled the country and claimed 
responsibility for providing services, even when it failed to do so. Although providing 
social services would legitimize Al-Hirak as the best alternative for the government in 
Sanaʿa, it did not attempt to do that on a reasonable scale.  
Al-Hirak utilized social services to gain the public support; however, it 
depended upon the government’s inability to provide the expected social and basic 
services like electricity, medication, and decent education. It promised to provide all 
services to the people when it gained office after the separation. However, this was too 
risky for Al-Hirak. If the government in Sanaʿa recognized the issues and provided the 
basic services, Al-Hirak would be out of business.  
c. Glory and Excitement 
Al-Hirak leaders were experts in propaganda and the ability to mobilize 
their citizens. They relied upon the mass gathering of their supporters to gain more 
supporters and recruit more people. When an individual form the movement or an 
individual from the South was killed, hit, or injured by security forces, Al-Hirak 
supporters came with the separation flag and called him a martyr if killed, or a 
revolutionary if injured. The death would be a demonstration in Aden or Aldalea, which 
created glory for the movement in the rural areas and among unemployed or oppressed 
individuals who achieved their goals by joining Al-Hirak. Al-Hirak then gave them 
respect and a feeling of being important; this provided them with a reason to live, and a 
reason to die. 
2. Duty and Honor 
People may think that unity is great and support it strongly. However, they may 
feel obligated to act against their basic beliefs due to their moral obligation to protect 
their people against wrong doings by the government or revenge for oppression. 
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Therefore, the moment those individuals feel bad for their people and believe they need 
to act is the movement they join Al-Hirak, even if they do not believe in its values.  
a. Fighting Repression 
Fighting repression is one of the core values Al-Hirak relies on to get 
public support in the South. After the 1994 civil war, the corrupt leaders from the North 
and the South exploited their position and took lands that belonged to common people 
from the South, the retired military officers stayed in their villages isolated as an 
untouchable people, and any individual who spoke against corrupt leaders was considered 
a separatist, which was a great crime. Although corrupt leaders in the government were 
suppressing the whole country North, East, West, and South, it was easy for the separatist 
movement to sell the narrative of repression only to the South. Al-Hirak blamed the 
reunification for enabling corrupt figures to destroy the country.  
Southern members joined Al-Hirak after individuals were killed or 
injured, or a leader was imprisoned. It is one of the Yemeni’s characteristics to support 
their family members, friends or neighbors against strangers or the government, even if 
they do not like what they do. People would join Al-Hirak if the government imprisoned, 
injured, or killed any member they knew. According to Al-Hirak, corrupt leaders from 
the South were able to destroy the country under Sanaʿa’s governmental protection. 
Fighting repression was a metaphor that was easy to sell in Yemen, because Al-Hirak 
needed little effort to prove Sanaʿa government corruption and dictatorship. 
b. Defending Homeland or People and Ejecting the Occupier 
It has not been easy for the Al-Hirak to sell the narrative of occupation 
since the country was reunited in 1990. However, grievances of the people that were 
experienced by the people in the South at the hands of the unity army who looted the 
South during and after the civil war has paved the road for Al-Hirak to sell their 
narrative. Al-Hirak paints a picture of the North as occupiers who want the South in order 
to loot it, destroy its goods, and deplete its resources. The Arab Spring gave Al-Hirak, 
what is called in social movement theory, a political opportunity to strengthen its position 
but at the same time affected its narrative. However, repression still plays in favor of Al-
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Hirak. Although the president and other key leaders in the government are now from the 
South, the Southern people still suffer from repression. Therefore, Al-Hirak is perceived 
to support the people of the South.  
c. Seeking Revenge 
Revenge in Yemen has been very common, because people of Yemen do 
not easily forget being defeated. They would spend their lives looking for opportunities to 
take revenge. In Al-Hirak’s case, revenge was a main factor of the movement. Retired 
military officers, who were mainly from the Tughma, sought revenge from the 
government in Sanaʿa for defeating them during the civil war, and for marginalizing them 
afterward. The retired military officers also sought revenge from the Southern Zumra, 
who fought on the side of the unity army during the civil war, and held positions in the 
government in the name of the South.  This explained the continuity of the movement, 
regardless of having the president, the prime minister, the minister of defense, head of 
national security bureau, and other officials who held key positions from the Southern 
part of the country. Those who were holding positions were considered to be from the 
Zumra from whom the Tugma are seeking revenge. Currently, President Hadi has 
reinforced this idea by appointing many officials from Zumra, instead or retuning some 
of the Tugma to government key positions to reduce the congestion. Alley asserts that, 
“now, a common complaint is that Yemen has moved from the Sanhanization of the state 
(Sanhan is Saleh’s tribal area) to the Abyanization of the state (Abyan is Hadi’s home 
governorate).142 
Al-Hirak is the solution to the retired military officers’ dilemma, because 
after the separation, Al-Hirak leaders, who are mainly from the Tughma, would go back 
to their official positions, which would then enable them to marginalize the Zumra 
officials, including President Hadi. For the common people, revenge is important because 
they felt oppressed not only by the government in Sanaʿa but also by the Northern people, 
                                                 




including religious figures who declared the war on the South during 1994. In addition, 
the Zumra marginalized most of the Tughma people after the 1994 civil war.  
Although revenge is a factor that affects many disputes in Yemen, 
forgiveness is also a powerful factor that works against revenge. Yemeni people forget 
easily if their honor is not hurt, and the other side admits what they did and asks for 
forgiveness. If the government in Sanaʿa worked on forgiveness, Al-Hirak would lose 
revenge as a motivating factor. Nonetheless, the government should consider solving the 
problems that exist in the South, return the properties and lands to their rightful owners, 
return the government employees to their positions and provide them with decent 
salaries, and then ask for forgiveness.  
3. Rewards 
Rewards can be viewed as short- and long-term factors. There are instant rewards 
people may receive like money, power, and prestige, but more importantly, there are 
long-term rewards that are very critical for Al-Hirak to survive. Both long-term and 
short-term rewards are essential in terms of public support. 
a. Financial  
Al-Hirak supporters have been mainly peasants and retired civil and 
military servants. Most Al-Hirak members were oppressed and marginalized, and most 
are military and civilians who were forced to retire after the civil war and suffered from 
shortage of money. They did not even receive their total salaries. Therefore, a promise to 
provide financial support after separation was an excellent long-term reward for members 
of Al-Hirak. In addition, instant financial support was critical. Individuals would support 
the separation if they received more benefits from it, rather than continuing with the 
reunited system that marginalized them. Al-Hirak gave money to active participants, 
promising more after separation for every Southerner.  Al-Hirak was relying mainly on 
the exiled leaders and some of the Yemeni labor in Gulf countries and the West, 
especially those who were exiled after the 1994 civil war and felt obliged to support the 
movement in the South.  
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b. Power 
Taking revenge, gaining money, fighting corruption, returning the stolen 
land, and supporting the Southern people are linked by way or another with power. Power 
can be seen in those who need to be empowered over their villagers or others who need to 
seize power over the county. Al-Hirak provides a road map for individuals to get power. 
It promises them positions in the new state. Besides, some of Al-Hirak leaders have felt 
the power currently by being leaders who give orders and are served by other members. 
Al-Hirak is giving luxury for people who got nothing from unity but marginalization. 
Therefore, power is a key factor behind the movement and working to sustain it. 
c. Prestige 
Prestige here is held for the two main categories representing the Southern 
movement. The retired military officers and civil servants who lost their power and 
prestige after 1994 find it in Al-Hirak where people start looking for their advice, 
obeying their orders, and honoring them. For retired military officers and former Socialist 
party leaders, Al-Hirak is the lost island they eventually found to get back to their 
luxurious life even if it was only in terms of respect and feeling important once again. 
For the peasants and youth who do not get the respect they deserve, either 
because they are poor, uneducated, or young, Al-Hirak grants them the prestige they 
seek. They get to attend the elders’ meetings, participate in the demonstrations, and most 
important get their voice heard by those who would not listen if Al-Hirak did not exist. 
Nonetheless, Al-Hirak’s giving prestige to the peasant is working only in the short-term. 
If Al-Hirak grows, its leaders will no longer give the peasants the respect they gave them 
earlier, because the leaders of Al-Hirak, just like the government in Sanaʿa, are corrupt. 
They do not really care about the people. Prestige still works in the long-term for leaders 
of Al-Hirak and tribal leaders who support it. Therefore, the Yemeni government should 
understand this factor and launch programs that grant equality and empowerment to the 
people by giving them a voice to decide how they organize themselves in order for the 
government to defeat Al-Hirak. 
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C. PERCEIVED LEGITIMACY OF VIOLENCE 
Huge debates exist among the different factions of Al-Hirak about the legitimacy 
of using violence and the ability of sustaining an insurgency. There have been some 
occasions when coercion was practiced against Northern individuals who live or work in 
Southern cities for a limited time. For example, on July 11, a Northern merchant was 
killed in al-Dali’ with his son and brother-in-law; on July 25, a grocer from Taiz was 
murdered in Zinjibbar, and in early December 2009, Northern residents in the South 
feared for their lives and returned to their homes in the North.143 
Violence is a two edges sword. It enables Al-Hirak to draw a line between the 
Northern and Southern people and to remind the people about the history of separation 
that was full of hate. It has also forced several families from the North to abandon their 
houses or work in Southern cities. Al-Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula (EQAP) has presented 
to Al-Hirak its way of struggling against the Yemeni government, which is their common 
enemy. As Phillips asserts, “Al-Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula had provided its support to 
what it calls the Southern struggle. It would legitimize their use of violence only when 
they accept Sharea law as a way of life after separation.144 
The Al-Hirak faction that uses violence hopes to ignite clashes between the 
people from the North against Southern people.  They might attack Southerners in 
Sanaʿa, for example, as revenge for what Al-Hirak did to Northern people in Aden, 
which, if it happens, will grant Al-Hirak great success in achieving its goal. However, 
this tactic has not worked and apparently will not. People of the North, despite their 
grievances, fall in love with unity, and deep in their hearts they know that Southerners 
feel the same way.  The general understanding in the North of the movement 
marginalized those acts and categorized them as criminal rather than political actions.  
Al-Hirak understands that using violence will legitimize reactions by the 
government against Al-Hirak, whose members had bad experiences in 1986 and 1994. 
                                                 
.143 Day, Regionalism and Rebellion in Yemen: A Troubled National Union, 250. 
.144 Phillips, “Yemen: On the Brink: What Comes Next in Yemen? Al-Qaeda, the Tribes, and State-
Building.” 
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They have not recovered from violence. Therefore, Al-Hirak is better off without 
violence. Except for Ali Albeedh, who has called several times for armed resistance, Al-
Hirak leaders understand that violence will get them nothing compared to a peaceful 
means145 Violence may cost Al-Hirak its cause, lives, resources, and national and 
international sympathy they gained over time. Therefore, violence is not a choice on the 
table right now. Violence can be framed in terms of religious beliefs, revenge, cultural 
prosperity, or necessity in desperation.  
1. Religious Beliefs and the Ideological, Ethical Tolerance for Violence 
In a country that is more than 99 percent Muslim and where the population has 
the same bright history, speaks the same language, depends on the same resources, and 
shares the same values, norms, and morals, it is very difficult for a group of people to 
utilize religion as a tool to justify violence or manipulate ethics to fit violence into an 
acceptable category. Until now, neither religious figures in the North nor religious 
scholars of the South have issued what is called a fatwa to legitimize killing the other.  
However, Al-Hirak is taking steps to enable itself to resist any possible Fatwas by 
the Northern scholars who oppose separation. It is attacking scholars (Ulama) of the 
Islamic brotherhood to delegitimize their ideas and Fatwas. The Ulama of Al-Hirak are 
mobilized to make separation acceptable and important for a good future, as they usually 
say, for the North and South. To this end, Al-Hirak is using the slogan “one nation, two 
countries.”   
Attempts are being made by Al-Hirak to convince Southern people that Northern 
people are “the others.” If Al-Hirak succeeds in these attempts, it will legitimize any 
violence against the people from the North and against the army, which then will be seen 
as occupation forces despite the fact that the commander-in-chief and most of its 
commanders are from the South. 
                                                 




Personal revenge is very common and accepted in the Yemeni culture. A relative 
of a murdered person would be ready to use violence against those who he thinks killed 
his relative, if he has the chance to do so. Therefore, if Al-Hirak leaders planned to use 
violence, they would find a way to enable individuals to use violence, which will lead to 
more violence, and eventually lead people to think of using violence only for revenge. 
Apart from individual accidents that happen now and then, and that result in 
people being killed by Al-Hirak, there is nothing occurring on a scale that would initiate 
or legitimize violence for revenge. As an Islamic society, revenge in Yemen is only 
legitimized to equal the bad actions and individuals who would seek revenge from a 
person who committed the sin. Furthermore, using revenge for violence is culturally 
permitted only in response to violence; it cannot be used to retaliate against 
marginalization. Because Al-Hirak is motivated by people’s rights and grievances that 
were ignored in the past, violence as a tool for revenge would be very limited unless 
clashes occur that ignited problems between the army or security forces on one side and 
Al-Hirak on the other. The Yemeni government seems to understand the case and is 
wisely being very patient with Al-Hirak members’ activities. 
3. Cultural Propensity for Acceptance of Violence 
Because the Yemeni culture does not believe in violence, the Yemenis are very 
peaceful people. While Most Yemeni Men carry Ak-47s and wear daggers (Janbias) all 
the time, violence and crime is very low compared with other developed countries like 
U.S. The Arab Spring proved the peacefulness of the Yemeni people, who seek peaceful 
means to end their disputes. The current Al-Hirak leadership and its stakeholders have 
suffered from the 1986 and the 1994 civil wars. They were former leaders of the YSP,146  
and therefore, they know exactly what it means to use violence. That is why violence is 
                                                 
.146 “Breaking Point? Yemen’s Southern Question,” Middle East Report No. 114, International Crisis 
Group. 
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not a choice, and will not be in the near future, except for self-defense and as the last 
resort.147 
Even if the violence were to be in retaliation for violent repression of Al-Hirak by 
others who committed such acts fires, it would undoubtedly turn public opinion against 
them. People in the South are very educated and know what it means to use violence. 
People have suffered a lot, and they are not ready to tolerate the consequences of more 
violence. If Al-Hirak used violence, its popular support would decline, and it would lose 
legitimacy and supporters. 
4. Necessary Desperation 
There is nothing more dangerous than when a person says, “There is nothing else 
I can do to take back my rights except to use violence.” To justify their unreasonable 
violence, insurgencies, governments, and terrorist organizations use the last resort 
argument. Currently, Al-Hirak cannot rely upon religion to legitimize violence, as it is 
unacceptable in ethics and in Yemeni culture. However, Al-Hirak can inject religion and 
ethics by necessity, and as a last resort. Necessary desperation is very dangerous. Feeling 
there is nothing to do but promote violence to gain your rights is dangerous, and it can 
happen with Al-Hirak. 
Until recently, Al-Hirak was relying upon peace as the main stream of its 
movement. The government has to control its reactions, use only limited and necessary 
force to suppress any violence, and avoid using violence against civilians, to avoid 
justification of violence as a reaction. 
 
 
                                                 
.147 A Southern officer explained to me a time when members of Al-Hirak refused to use violence 
against harassment by military forces in Al-Dhali even though they were able to seize the tanks and control 
the area. They chose not to react in spite of the fact that they are retired professional military officers who 
are better trained than the military forces that were wearing slippers,” he said. 
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D. ACCEPTABILITY OF COSTS AND RISKS 
All movements accept risks when they are established. Those who do not accept 
risks cannot exist in the first place. Therefore, the question should be, to what extent can 
a movement or an individual accept risk, and what cost is he willing to pay? Acceptance 
of costs and risks depends upon the goals the individuals and the movement want to 
achieve, the rewards they will get, and the obligations they believe they have. There are 
some related factors to be examined, like intimidation, and assessment of the likely 
victor; however, it is always a matter of risks and benefits. Therefore, a good narrative 
can make people accept risk, and having no alternative, can also make people accept even 
more risk.  
1. Intimidation 
Intimidation is used by both Al-Hirak and the government. When the government 
puts more pressure on the Southern people and manipulates them, it pushes them to join 
Al-Hirak. At the same time, Al-Hirak is pressuring people to join the movement or at 
least appear to be joining the movement. For example, Al-Hirak Al-Janubi uses 
intimidation to force civil disobedience in Aden and other areas in the South, to send a 
message to the international community regarding its ability to control the South.  
Intimidation is a great technique for Al-Hirak in urban areas, but it will work 
against Al-Hirak if used in the rural areas where tribal sheikhs are powerful. In a tribal 
society, intimidation does not really work since it affects the tribal leaders’ luxury and 
sovereignty, which will have bad consequences in the long term. Al-Qaeda in Iraq is a 
living example of failed intimidation measures against tribes. Al Zarqawi lost when he 
suppressed tribal leaders and tried to control them.148 Intimidation is a useful tool for 
mobilizing support in the short-term, but is likely have unpleasant consequences in the 
long term. 
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2. Assessment of a Likely Victor 
There is an old Yemeni saying that describes what a majority of the people always 
do. The saying is “I am with the strong with Allah’s help” (Maʿa alqawi Ya awon allah).  
People will be with the strong most of the time. At the beginning of the Al-Hirak 
movement, people were very alert. They did not declare their support for separation 
because they did not see it winning. However, the Arab Spring gave the political 
opportunity for Al-Hirak Al-Janubi to openly state its goals. It enabled Al-Hirak to show 
its success. Although the success of Al-Hirak still relies upon what the government does 
and how it responds to the people’s demands, Al-Hirak has proven its power and ability 
to control certain areas and mobilize a great number of the people.  
The government still appears strong in the eyes of the people, especially after 
defeating the Al-Qaeda militarily in Abyan and its ability to mobilize tribal support from 
the South itself. The military reform decisions on April 2013 played in favor of unity in 
terms of public support. Nonetheless, whoever wins or loses public support in the near 
future is linked to the decisions made by the grievances committee that are currently 
receiving claims from the people in the South, and the Southern case committee in the 
NDC. If these committees solve most of the problems and military reform proves a 
success, Al-Hirak Al-Janubi would lose much of the public support it currently enjoys.   
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VI. AL-HIRAK AL-JANUBI’S NARRATIVES 
A. DIAGNOSTIC FRAMES  
1. Southern Plight 
Reunification is a symbol of systematic discrimination and exploitation of the 
South. Discrimination and exploitation policies are implemented via “blurring the 
identity and culture, destruction of the institutional infrastructure and human resources, 
murder and exclusion of the Southern cadres, plundering the resources and the 
capabilities of the South, and political containment of the Southern issues.”149 
The Southern people are very poor and barely surviving, while corrupt individuals 
from the North are exploiting the South’s lands and resources.150 The Government in 
Sanaʿa discriminates against the Southern people who are exempt from important 
positions in the public service. Even those high positions that were given to Southern 
individuals were largely symbolic.151
 
The Southern citizens have been discriminated against, not only as second-class 
Yemeni people, but they have been described as non-indigenous Yemenis. They are said 
to be new arrivals from Somalia, Ethiopia, India, and Pakistan. For example, Ali Salem 
al-Beedh, who signed the declaration of unity, was described as being Indian (Hindi), an 
extreme racial discrimination that strips Southerners of their right to land and history.152 
 
                                                 
.149 “Al-Hirak Al-Janubi’s Vision of the Roots of the Southern Case,” Yemeni National Dialogue 
Conference, Sana’a, http://ndc.ye/ar-issue.aspx?show=1. 
.150 Brehony, Yemeni Divided: The Story of a Failed State in South Arabia, 211. 
.151 Stephen Day, “The Political Challenge of Yemen’s Southern Movement,” in Yemen  on the Brink, 
ed. Christopher Boucek and Marina Ottaway (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, 2010), 65. 
.152 “Al-Hirak Al-Janubi’s Vision of the Roots of the Southern Case,” Yemeni National Dialogue 
Conference. 
 72 
The Southern youth are deprived of receiving scholarships abroad, along with 
opportunities to continue their studies and obtain higher degrees.153
 
The government in 
Sanaʿa has been depriving the new generation in the South from enrollment to many 
institutes. For example, they are prevented from joining civilian and military colleges and 
other military and security institutions. Even worse, they are denied employment in 
absolute terms in state public services such as the judiciary and public prosecutorial 
offices, oil and diplomatic fields, and in financial areas such as taxation, finance, and 
customs offices.154  As Lewis asserts, “Following the unquestionable victory of the North 
of Yemen over the South, President Saleh’s regime set about a process of purging 
Southern leaders from key positions in the South and replacing them with Northern 
officials.”155 
The Southern people were not only denied opportunities to work in high-level 
leadership positions in the state public administration, but also from public office at the 
middle and low levels in their provinces. The retired Southerners were called the political 
party of “stay home” (Hizb khallik belbait).156 “There are whole ministries in Sanaʿa that 
do not have a single Southerner employee.”157 Besides, as Day asserts, “throughout the 
last half of the 1990s, top military commanders in the Southwest, mid-Southern, and 
eastern regions, had family and tribal connections to President Saleh in Sana’a.”158 
Repression is not limited to education and employment opportunities. The 
business field has a great share as well. For example, Sanaʿa government has denied 
import and export licenses to Southerners. The South has been under systematic 
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impoverishment policies from Sanaʿa, leaving the country in need of charities from the 
two-occupying parties (GPC and Islah) and other associations with political religious 
orientations.159 
In the Republic of Yemen, the educational system is very poor, the administrative 
system is very corrupt, the military is corrupt and controlled by families in the North, 
electricity is very unreliable or not available, Yemeni sport is shameful, and the police 
force is very corrupt. Besides, over all, sheikhs from the North control Yemeni 
government, justice is absent, and people are very poor. Furthermore, experts, educated 
and faithful individuals, are exempt from good positions if not forced out of jobs. This 
narrative aims to open the wounds of the Southern people. Despite the fact that the whole 
country is suffering, the Southerners are suffering more. Al-Hirak is working day and 
night to convert existing grievances into revolutionary ideas. 
2. It is an Occupation, It is Not Unity 
The South came to unity with good faith and great intentions. Its intent was to 
build a state associated with the practice of democracy. However, centers of military, 
tribal, and religious groups’ power in the North were not peaceful.  Abdullah Bin 
Hussaien Al-Ahmar (one of the key tribal leaders and a speaker of the House of 
Representatives) admitted this in his memoir. He mentioned an agreement between 
himself and Ali Abdullah Saleh to form an opposition political party, mainly to weaken 
the YSP. Both Ali Saleh and Al-Ahmar created the Islah party on September 9, 1990.160 
As a political Islamic party, Islah expressed its opposition to unity through its 
rejection of the constitution’s referendum. Although the Islah party mobilized 
demonstrations to express its rejection of the new so-called a “secular constitution,” the 
same people fought in 1994 to protect the same constitution.161 The system in Sanaʿa has 
killed unity by abolishing significant documents under which the unity was established. 
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For example, most of the unity Constitution’s articles have been modified more than 
once. All modifications were implemented only to enhance the control of the victorious 
party.162 
In the name of unity, the South has given major concessions including its capital, 
its currency, the head of state [position], the land of wide sea beaches, islands and 
multiple natural resources while the North gave nothing in return.163 While the Northern 
elite held capital in the form of land and business enterprises, Southern citizens’ lands 
were controlled by the YSP. They depend mainly on their salaries from the 
government.164 After the civil war, the Sanaʿa regime has distributed the land of the 
South as gifts to relatives and loyalists of the Sanaʿa regime, as a gift from God to the 
Northern supporters while Southern people could not find land to bury their dead.165 
 
Furthermore, the tribal, military, and religious alliance in Sanaʿa has committed the most 
heinous human rights violations in the South during and after the 1994 civil war “in 
which some are difficult to mention because it is not appropriate to say that Muslims 
have committed it.”166 
In an interview with Monitor News, Ali Salem stated that,  
They were not willing to form a civil state and did not want to implement 
the agreement we signed with them. President Saleh formed the Al-Islah 
(Reform) Party with Sheikh Abdullah Al-ahmar. This is an Islamist party. 
They considered the people of the South to be communists, and thus, they 
all formed alliances among themselves to get rid of us. Meanwhile, we 
entered into the unity agreement and worked with them on the basis that 
we are a single state and a single people. Yet, they carried out acts that 
undermined this unity and occupied the South. Since that time (July 7, 
1994), we consider the South to be occupied. Today, the people are 
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expressing their views in a civil, peaceful and civilized manner in order to 
restore their state and their identity.167 
Ali Salem al-Beedh declared separation on May 21, 1994, meaning that the 
reunification was over. What happened during and after the 1994 civil war was an 
occupation by the Northern army and traders from the South. Therefore, it is every 
Southern citizen’s responsibility to join the movement to drive the Northern occupation 
out of the Southern state.  
What happened in 1989 and 1990 was an agreement between two individuals (Ali 
Abdullah Saleh and Ali Salem al-Beedh) only. Neither the Northern nor the Southern 
people were involved in the decision making process. In fact, the unity agreement 
between the North and the South consists of only one page while Germany’s unity 
agreement consists of more than a thousand. Therefore, reunification was driven by 
passion and not by extensive and realistic studies. In addition, what is based on falsehood 
is false.168 
Occupation is an essay narrative a movement can make to get supporters and 
mobilize its members. However, in Yemen, the case is a little different. Trying to 
convince the people that the North is occupying the South when in fact the president, the 
prime minister, the minister of defense, the head of national security bureau, the head of 
military intelligence, and the military commanders are from the South is hard to do—
especially after the military reform decisions by the president that unified the military and 
proved the new president had control of the country. However, Al-Hirak leaders still 
repeat the word “occupation” convincing the people that the president and other figures 
in the government are not really ruling. 
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3. Southern Arabia 
The South was never part of Yemen. It is Southern Arabia, not Southern Yemen. 
Therefore, reunification was wrong in the first place. The name of Yemen was given to 
the South by the YSP when in fact the South is historically and culturally different. For 
example, occupying British forces called the South “Southern Arabia,” which has nothing 
to do with Yemen. Therefore, what is happening now in the South is a Yemeni 
occupation of the Southern Arabia. 
As stated in the vision for the Southern case, “the facts of history have been 
ignored. These two entities [the South and North system in Yemen] were not united in 
any era of history. Unity was based in passion, not in accordance with the logic and 
reason, and there are differences among the systems economically, culturally, and 
socially.”169  
This narrative is used to justify separation. By demonstrating that the South has 
not been part of Yemen at any time, the Al-Hirak movement is justified. With this 
narrative, the government in Sanaʿa will be perceived as occupying a country instead of a 
corrupt government. 
4. Unjust War (1994 Civil War Calamity) 
The 1994 Civil War, in addition to the Southern plight, is what broke the back of 
unity. The unjust civil war was launched by Ali Saleh’s regime against the South using 
every unjustified and dehumanizing means possible, and the South became the booty for 
corrupt Northern individuals. Ali Saleh used the religious, tribal, and Al-Qaeda veterans 
to fight what was called “the infidels.”  They supported him only so they could loot from 
the Southern people. As Baʿaum noted, “The civil war by the ‘ousted’ President Ali 
Abdullah Saleh to invade the South, which reneged on all the covenants and agreements 
signed with its political unity and partnership project, has set all unity foundations for 
failure.”170 The Southern people were defeated in 1994. As a result, the Yemeni 
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occupation forces were distributed in each governorate to suppress the people of the 
South, just like any other occupation forces would do.  
The international community and the U.N. Security Council were aware of the 
separation and did not support the South against the occupation. The day Ali Saleh 
declared war on the South should be commemorated as a calamity. The Southern people 
condemn what happened during and after the civil war. During that war, the president of 
the South, Ali Salem, was forced into exile, and he should come back because he is still 
the president of the South.  
After the unjust war, instead of implementing its commitments to the international 
community made during the civil war, the Sanaʿa government has implemented a policy 
of exclusion and deportation of Southerners.  Civil and military individuals have shared 
the property of the people of the South, including lands, real estate, factories, and 
farms.171 Besides, the Southern citizens were denied opportunities to elect their 
representatives in the House of Representatives (the parliament) and local councils. All 
elected individuals represent the two main parties in the North, namely, the GPC and 
Islah.172 This narrative is used to justify separatism by proving the civil war against the 
separatists in 1994 was unjust. 
B. PROGNOSTIC FRAMES 
1. The Resources 
The Southern people may not exceed six million, which represents only 25 
percent out of the total 25 million people in Yemen. The unity government is very 
dependent on its budget, with almost 70 percent of it based on the gas and oil reserves 
discovered in Hadramawt. Oil and gas fields in the North, especially in Marib, are 
draining. Therefore, even with an uncorrupt unity government, the South is losing. The 
resources that are extracted from Hadramawt are used to support 25 million people when 
they should only support 6 million people (the Southern people). The Southern people are 
                                                 




very poor while their oil is sold to cover expenses in Sanaʿa and other places in the 
North.173  
When the South obtains its independence, the oil, regardless of its small amount, 
will be more than enough for the South. The South will be one of the rich Gulf countries, 
and the North will be waiting for help from the South. Therefore, instead of begging the 
government in Sanaʿa to help the Southern governorates, Sanaʿa will be begging the 
South to get financial support. 
This narrative aims to draw the feeling of being exploited and convincing the 
Southern people that before reunification these resources were not available. Now with 
these resources, compared with the number of the people in the South, the South will be 
one of the Gulf countries. Besides, one of the big aims of separation is to restore and 
retain the resources of the South so that these resources will be exploited only by the 
Southerners. 
2. Unity of the Southern People (Nation) 
Separation from the North is essential to maintain and keep unity in the South. 
The government in Sanaʿa has worked and is working hard to separate the Southern 
people. The South can only be united after separation from the North. The painful history 
that they have experienced since 1967 will be gone when the people join al-Hirak. Now 
the Southern people have a common goal, which is to build a new democratic and 
developed Southern state. This narrative is used to counter the idea of different Southern 
factions and disparities within the separatist movement. Al-Hirak is attempting to 
convince the people that the South will be united under its umbrella. 
3. Separation Is the Solution 
For the sake of retaining resources, for the sake of a modern and democratic state, 
for the sake of coming out of slavery and marginalization by the North, and for the sake 
of a decent life, the South has to separate from Republic of Yemen. People of the South 
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are grieving, exploited, occupied, and oppressed by the corrupt individuals from the 
Yemeni occupation and their infidels from the South.  
The resources of the South are used to feed the whole country of 25 million 
instead of 6 million. Those resources cannot feed the whole county but can make the 
Southern people very rich. Despite the Sanaʿa government’s efforts, if any, the problems 
of the Southern people will not be solved. The only solution for all these problems is 
separation. By separation, the South will have enough resources to be rich. It can end 
corruption and build a real democracy. And all the bright future of the South can only be 
reached by separation. This narrative is mainly used to counter the government’s efforts 
to solve the Southern people’s grievances. When separation is the only solution, the 
Sanaʿa government’s efforts can be only painkillers. They can delay the problem but will 
never solve it. 
C. MOTIVATIONAL  
1. Bright Future in a New Civil Institutional State 
Regardless of the dark history of the South, after it is granted its independence, 
the South will be one of the Gulf countries. The South has the resources and expertise. 
Susanne Dahlgren asserts, “Bad governance and corruption is thought to be characteristic 
of the Northern culture at large.”174 Therefore, corruption will vanish, and South Yemen 
will be a great developed country. After separation, every citizen will be respected and 
treated equally. Development will move faster than its pace currently. Besides, Aden will 
regain its glory and fame as the new Dubai in the 21
st
 century.  
The state in the South will not be as it was during or even before reunification. It 
will not come back to YSP. Instead, the Southern state will be a modern state with great 
institutions, free elections, separate authorities, and a free court system. There will be rule 
of law and great government administrations that support the people instead of robbing 
them. After separation, there will be national consensus where people will forgive each 
other and live happily ever after. What is standing between these dreams and the people 
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of the South is reunification. This narrative gives the hope and reason behind the 
separatist concept.  It gives the people hope and draws a very bright picture of the South 
after separation. 
2. Responsibility and Duty of Resistance and Traders  
It is the responsibility of each individual in the South to join the Al-Hirak. Those 
who do not join will have no future in the new government. Everybody has to join the 
movement to get the benefits of the new state after independence. It is a religious duty to 
support the grieving people and end injustice and corruption. This narrative is used by the 
movement to justify repression of unity supporters and to get financial support from 
businesspersons and donations from average depoliticized people. 
Since the whole South is for separation, only traitors, who receive money from 
the Northern government, are supporting unity. Traitors should be treated as occupation 
agents. This narrative is used to ensure that supporters of unity are coerced to join Al-
Hirak. By joining Al-Hirak, unity supporters will change from traitors to heroes. If unity 
supporters join Al-Hirak, at least they will no longer express their opinion openly against 
Al-Hirak supporters and risk being treated as occupiers’ agents. 
3. Absence of Hope 
The South has tried unity. It turned out that unity was not the solution for the 
Southerners’ problems. Instead of solving the Southern problems, reunification enabled 
corrupt leaders from the North and the South to exploit the resources for their own 
benefit. The government in Sanaʿa has promised many times that it will solve the 
Southern problem, but instead it has continued supporting corrupt leaders. Some 
Southern leaders have tried to make proposals and projects to resolve the political 
situation of the South after the tragic war in 1994, such as removing the effects of the war 
by reforming and purifying the path to reunification and initiating a national 
reconciliation. The first attempt was in December 2001 when a group of Southern 
dignitaries, including members of the parliament, leaders of political parties, 
organizations, tribes, and businessmen, met in Sanaʿa throughout the month of Ramadan 
to discuss the Southern grievances. The meeting participants drafted a letter of complaint 
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to Saleh, which was delivered to his office with no result. The complaint was published 
in a newspaper and had no effect. This convinced the Southerners of the absence of hope 
and the need to form an organized resistance against the regime in Sanaʿa.175  
Nonetheless, the regimes and powerful figures in Sanaʿa continued, unjustifiably, 
rejecting all valuable and honest proposals.176 
The Arab Spring, instead of taking down the old regime, ending family and tribal 
control of civil and military institutions, and bringing new fresh and loyal blood to lead 
the country, brought back the old faces. President Hadi was the Vice President of the old 
regime, and the current government is giving favor to the GPC and Islah while the 
Southern people are exempted. There is no hope with unity. Everything will continue to 
be the same if not worse. This narrative, which kills the hope of any good future linked 
with unity, is used to counter the Yemeni Arab Spring narratives. The absence of hope 
narrative is the result of the government’s failure to deliver its reform promises to the 
Southern people.177 
4. One Nation, Two States 
If there is no hope for the people under reunification, they should seek another 
path and try to find decent lives through separation. However, The nation will continue to 
share its history and relationships but in two-states system.178 It is yet to be compulsory, 
but this narrative with time will be used in the near future to support the idea of Jihad if 
violence is to be used. In Islam, unity is necessary. Anyone who calls for separation is 
against the general understanding of Muslims. Southern scholars, who issue Fatwas, use 
this narrative to justify separation saying it is acceptable for Muslims to separate if there 
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is more benefit in separation than in unity, which is the case in Yemen. Its aim is to 
support violence in the future if needed. 
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VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS  
Regardless of the harm Al-Hirak Al-Janubi has done to the stability and security 
of the united country and the unintentional political opportunity it provided for Al-Qaeda 
to operate more freely in the South, Al-Hirak is a social movement that aims to support 
its people in the South and has great intentions and respect toward their brothers in 
Northern governorates. Al-Hirak was established to fight against corruption, 
discrimination, and the marginalization of Southern people by corrupt government 
officials, tribal shiekhs, and political figures. Therefore, separation is not the desired end 
result for Al-Hirak; it is a means toward an end, which is to restore the Southern people’s 
dignity, grant equality, secure stolen resources, and produce a fair and just life for its 
people. 
Al-Hirak Al-Janubi is composed of factions with an anarchic structure. It is a mix 
of tribal loyalists, former YSP members and leaders, and youths who found their future 
brighter as they became part of it. Alliances and fractures among factions, leaders, and 
activists are very common to the point that the observer gets confused as to who supports 
whom. Al-Hirak’s factions are fighting with each other over leadership, resources and the 
right to represent the South. However, Al-Hirak has ingredients that enabled it to rebel 
against the government and challenge the country’s main principle which is unity. It is 
taking advantage of the government’s mistakes and weaknesses and is creating its own 
opportunities to grow bigger by attracting more supporters who are willing to give 
money, time, effort, and even their lives, while the government is losing its authority and 
the glory of unity is growing dim.  
All conditions that are required for a successful social movement are available to 
Al-Hirak Al-Janubi. First of all, the South has grievances that can legitimize any 
movement against the Yemeni government. Al-Hirak has no problem selling its narrative 
to the Southern people. Reunification has given the South nothing other than poorness 
and marginalization. Their lands are robbed, their jobs are given to others, their culture is 
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marginalized, and their dignity is affected. Besides, the unity government is very corrupt 
and offers its people no hope for the future. These strong narratives are working to shore 
up Al-Hirak Al-Janubi. 
Al-Hirak Al-Janubi has had great political opportunities that have worked in its 
favor. The Houthies in the North helped by exploiting the weakness of the central 
government and diverting the government’s attention to the North, which helped the Al-
Hirak Al-Janubi movement during its  early growth phase. The 2006 presidential election 
opened the door to political and financial support for the movement by political parties in 
Sana’a in their fighting of each other. Besides, Faisal Ben Shamalan, who runs against 
Ali Abdullah Saleh repressing the JMPs, was from the South. He was humiliated by the 
GPC and Ali Saleh and was accused of supporting Al-Qaeda. Although many of the 
Southern people voted for him, he did not reach 30 percent of the votes. Therefore, the 
hope to have a president from the South was lost. The 2006 presidential election also 
produced disputes among tribal and political figures in Sana’a, which provided an 
exploitive opportunity for Al-Hirak.  
In terms of mobilization resources, Al-Hirak has the whole South to recruit from, 
it has great charismatic and symbolic leadership, and it has financial support within and 
from outside Yemen. Many Southern migrants in the Gulf countries are willing to 
provide extensive financial support to the movement because they believe in its cause. 
Al-Hirak has many factions that are indisposed to their fighting and claim the same goal 
which is to support and free the Southern people from the Northern occupation.  
Al-Hirak Al-Janubi’s social movement is able to frame its ideological and cultural 
concepts to support its cause, it has the ability to direct religion to support its cause, or at 
least to work against the religious beliefs in the North and the South that support the 
reunification. It has exploited socialist and communist ideologies to support its cause and, 
at the same time, denied any intention to adopt these ideologies if separation is achieved. 
Al-Hirak Al-Janubi has many motivational aspects to support the cause of the movement. 
For example, the movement offers many attractions to new recruits, appeals to the sense 
of duty and honor that each Southerner should fulfill, and promises rewards to those who 
join the movement and to the Southern people as well.  
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The Southern political, cultural, and economic grievances along with the 
narratives Al-Hirak has developed over the last 15 years; the movement’s mobilization 
structure in terms of leadership, financial resources, and recruitment opportunities; the 
several political opportunities, and many other factors discussed in this research suggest 
that Al-Hirak Al-Janubi will be a huge success in the near future unless it is addressed 
and treated immediately. 
However, by success, we do not mean that it will achieve its ultimate goal of 
separation. The movement’s success will be contained by the society who values unity as 
a worshiped principle. The success we mean is a success to challenge the government and 
survive against its measures that make Al-Hirak a potential enemy for the country and the 
government itself. The central government and religious figures in the North and South 
will not accept separation of the county. The president, the prime minister, the minister of 
defense, and many military and security commanders are from the South, and they do not 
accept what so-called separatists demand.  Therefore, if both sides continue to avoid 
listening to one another and negotiating in good faith, they will achieve neither true 
separation nor unity, and the country will be ruined. The real loser will be the simple and 
poor citizens in Yemen. Furthermore, the security of the region and consequently the 
world will undoubtedly be affected. This is especially likely if Yemen is exploited by Al-
Qaeda who waits for this political opportunity or other regional players who may use 
Yemen as a proxy to achieve their agenda. Therefore, since all sides will be affected, 
each side shares the responsibility to get the country out of this dangerous bottleneck.  
Yemen’s future will be determined by the way the Yemeni government, Yemeni 
society, and the international community—that favors a stable Yemen—choose to handle 
the Al-Hirak Al-Janubi social movement. The NDC is struggling to find a way out of the 
Southern problem. In fact, even all other issues that are discussed in the NDC are 
hostages of the Southern case. No agreements can be achieved on the new constitution, 
the type of the new state, transitional justice, or other matters until an agreement is 
achieved on the Southern case.  
The NDC’s struggle to find solutions to the Southern people’s grievances does not 
intercede for it among the main factions of Al-Hirak that refused any kind of participation 
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or recognition of a dialogue that is not between, what they claim, two states. Even the 
only faction that participates in the NDC (Almutamar al-wattani lishaʿb Al-janub) doubts 
any real outcome from it.179  At a time when Al-Hirak supporters are willing to die for 
separation, unity supporters are willing to die for unity, which makes Al-Hirak Al-Janubi 
a movement that is very effective, strong, and destructive to itself, the nation’s stability, 
and regional and international security.180  
The Yemeni government must act immediately to acquire international and 
regional support to end the cause of the Southern grievances, end corruption, provide the 
required services, and give the people hope of a future in a united state. Al-Hirak Al-
Janubi leadership should act in a way that supports the people of the South but does not 
destroy the county. They should continue with demands for a new democratic state that 
supports its people and ends discrimination against any minority, group, or region. They 
should demand a decentralized government that gives local institutions more power. But 
they should do so thoughtfully, honestly, and with care. 
For the sake of the regional and international stability, the international 
community has great responsibilities toward the Southern people, the Al-Hirak Al-Janubi 
movement, and the RoY as a whole. The Arab Spring has proved how Al-Qaeda can 
exploit a weak central government to build itself and occupy territories. Therefore, the 
RoY should be economically, administratively, and politically supported. More fighting 
in Yemen between the government and the Al-Houthies, Al-Hirak Al-Janubi, or any other 
movement can lead to a dark future, or could challenge the existence of Yemen as a 
                                                 
.179 Mohammed Ali Ahmed, in a message to President Hadi, stated his real concerns about the 
mechanism of the NDC and that the dialogue in its current state would not address the Southern case. He 
suggested substantive changes to make the dialogue genuine. One of his suggestions is to transfer the 
dialogue to a neighboring country and have it between the South and the North instead and without a limit. 
For more details, see “Mohammed Ali Ahmed Issues Conditions to Move the Dialogue between the North 
and the South to a Neutral Country Chosen by the Sponsors of the GCC Initiative,” Al-khabar News 
(August 15, 2013), http://sahafah.net/show1158161.html. 
.180 Jessica T. Mathews, “Foreword,” in Yemen on the Brink, ed. Christopher Boucek and Marina 
Ottaway (Washington  DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2010).   
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state.181 The following section will explain in detail what each player could do in order to 
reach a safe way out of this huge challenge.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. To the Yemeni Government 
The Yemeni government is one of the few governments that has had extensive 
experience with opposition movements. Yemen is made of elites and opposition 
movements represented by tribes, religious figures, and political parties. Al-Hirak is not 
the first and only movement the government is facing, and it will not be the last. 
Although the government is benefiting from continued experience with opposition 
movements, it lacks an overall strategic approach toward them. Part of that is explained 
by looking at the government’s weak and dysfunctional institutions that are occupied and 
managed by high, middle, and low-level corrupt officials. This is partially why the 
Yemeni government’s approach has been inconsistent and often supports and justifies Al-
Hirak’s existence. Therefore, there are positives to be continued, negatives to be avoided, 
and new policies to be implemented in order for the Yemeni government to fulfill its 
share of the solution.  
a. Effective Measures To Be Continued 
A presidential resolution has established a committee to investigate 
Southern land issues, and the return of the retired military and civilians to their jobs, 
along with other grievances and complaints. The committees, composed of judges and 
respected people from the South, have received more than 25,000 claims.182 Once those 
problems have been resolved, outstanding individuals and leaders from the Southern 
movement will join the unity government, and the narrative of the separation will be 
extremely affected.  
                                                 
.181 Boucek, “Yemen: Avoiding a Downward Spiral,” in Yemen on the Brink, ed. Christopher Boucek 
and Marina Ottaway (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2010).   
.182 “The Primary Evening News,” Yemen TV, April 19, 2013. 
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After taking office in 2012, President Hadi established what are called 
public committees (Allijan Alshabia) from the South. Although the main purpose of these 
committees is fighting Al-Qaeda in Abyen, they are playing a significant role in 
supporting the unity government next to the military forces. The public committees 
legitimize the unity government’s presence in the South and publicly support Hadi. The 
government is benefiting from these committees because they are respected fighters and 
tribesmen who represent a huge part of the South that cannot be ignored. Understanding 
their weight, Al-Hirak avoids any clashes with those committees. Although the public 
committees are not participating against Al-Hirak demonstrations or forming any militias 
to coerce Al-Hirak militias, they are forces in the hand of the Yemeni government that 
enable the government to use its iron fist when needed with little collateral damage to the 
relationship with Southern people.  
The government is supporting the lesser of two extreme factions, like 
Mohammed Ali Ahmed, who is participating in the NDC with several Al-Hirak members. 
However, the moderates are less popular among the Southern people, because they are 
perceived as traitors. The government tries to support moderate factions by accepting 
their demands to give them more legitimacy, hoping such efforts will delegitimize the 
radical factions. Moderate leaders are asked to denounce any extreme act by the extreme 
factions. 
The Yemeni government seems to understand that the more clashes occur 
between Southern demonstrations and security forces, the more casualties on both sides, 
the higher the temper, the more extreme Al-Hirak supporters become and the more 
supporters Al-Hirak gets. Therefore, the Yemeni government is dealing with caution. 
Although an inaction strategy may give Al-Hirak political and security space to act 
freely, recruit supporters, and show its strength, which will make any government 
suppression in the future very difficult, it opens new windows for dialogue with Al-Hirak 
and legitimizes moderate factions and supporters of unity among Southern people.  
The government has initiated new procedures to accept candidates for the 
Military and Police Academies that ensure a just way of accepting candidates from each 
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and every governorate.183 This practice will work against the Al-Hirak narrative of unjust 
and little representation in these academies. 
b. Practices To Be Avoided 
Lack of government measures is a two-edged sword. On one hand, it gives 
Al-Hirak members some space to release pressure, while on the other, Al-Hirak is 
showing its strength, and people in the South perceive it as a movement that can stand 
against the government that is consequently perceived as weak.  
The government is mainly relying upon assigning unity supporters to 
positions in the new administration to secure their support. This technique can only work 
against insurgencies that are isolated from the population. Besides, those who hold high 
level positions are claimed to be from the Zumra or from Abyan governorates, which 
means the Tughma will be motivated to insist on their demands for separation. If true, 
this is like putting oil on a fire, and will not help solve the problem. Just as Sanhaniation 
brought Saleh down from the throne, Abyanization will bring unity down, and will make 
the people from the South and the North a symbol of exploitation, instead of a symbol of 
pride.  
Ignorance of current suffering by the Aden governorate and other 
Southern governorates’ people as a result of the absence of electricity is affecting the new 
government’s credibility, and supporting narratives by the separationists. A government 
that is not able to provide electricity to its people during summer time cannot not do 
anything else. The people in Aden are threatening to go to the streets and conduct 
demonstrations, while the government is continuing to close its ears to these demands.184 
                                                 
.183  “Ministry of Defense sets 10 Centers in the Provinces for the Reception of Applicants for 
Admission to Military Academies,”Yemenat News, July 14, 2013, 
http://www.yemenat.net/video412.html/news37275.html. 
.184 “Sons of Aden Give the Government 48 Hours to Stabilize the Electricity and Threaten to Ignite 
Streets Outrages,” Yemen Press, July 14, 2013, http://sahafah.net/show1129836.html. 
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c. Policies That Should Be Implemented 
The Yemeni government should ensure, as Craig Cohen states, that they 
are “confronting impunity of political and criminal elites, resolving disputes peacefully, 
providing equality before the law, including justice for past grievances, protecting 
fundamental human, civil, and political rights, especially for women and minorities, [and] 
creating effective accountability procedures”185 by enforcing the law on its citizens and 
treating them equally. All things being equal, to the degree the unity government 
succeeds in enforcing law and order, to that degree the Yemeni government gains 
legitimacy.  
Limiting the amount of resources flowing to some extreme factions of Al-
Hirak Al-Janubi and policing its financing are essential to weaken its movement. As long 
as money continues to flow, the movement will continue, regardless of the government 
efforts to address people’s grievances. Currently, the Yemeni government measures to 
control financial flows are either very weak or absent. The government is very successful 
in controlling and observing Al-Qaeda money flowing to the country, but not with Al-
Hirak. To a certain degree, it has managed to control weapon flows. For example, the 
government has seized weapons on Aden and Mukha ports, and seized an Iranian ship 
full of heavy weapons, like anti-aircraft and anti-tanks rockets, believed to be for Al-
Hirak.186  
By providing enough information and intelligence to the businessmen who 
support the movement covertly, the government can indirectly force the businessmen to 
make decisions they would not do by delaying their imported items (i.e., harassing them 
with police forces in their stores). The government can trade their freedom of doing 
business by seizing their support to Al-Hirak. Besides, the government should protect 
Southern investors and businesses from Al-Hirak Al-Janubi’s harassment and repression 
to gain their minds and prevent Al-Hirak from exploiting them. So far, Al-Hirak 
                                                 
.185 Craig Cohen, “Measuring Progress in Stabilization and Reconstruction,” U.S. Institute of Peace, 
Stabilization and Reconstruction Series No. 1 (March, 2006), 9.  
.186 The Primary Evening News,” Yemen TV, Sana’a, Republic of Yemen, May 29, 2013, 
http://www.yemen-tv.net/. 
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supporters still enjoy sovereignty and the ability to do business freely because the 
government is perceived as weak and unable to harass them when Al-Hirak can. 
To find a way out of the snag, the Yemeni government should provide 
enough support to the moderate factions of the movement to enable them to get more 
supporters on the ground, which will enable them to initiate pro-unity demonstrations. At 
the same time, it should grant free demonstration legitimacy for any movement overtly, 
and exert some efforts to control those demonstrations until it limits them to a small 
corner. It can do that by issuing justified laws to regulate demonstrations and apply them 
to other demonstrations before it applies them on the Al-Hirak movement 
demonstrations. For example, Great Britain is famous for channeling and using indirect 
suppressions when dealing with insurgencies. It negotiates with leaders in the open and 
hits them very hard under the belt. Channeling can always produce good results when 
used wisely with less collateral damage; however, channeling is a long-term approach 
that can sometimes produce little in the short term. Therefore, it is necessary but not 
sufficient, to defeat social movements.  
The government should highlight great events that may reunite the 
Yemeni people, and give them hope and a common goal to rally around. For example, the 
government should spend reasonable efforts and money on sports like football. Having a 
strong football team will give the people hope and a common symbol. By symbolically 
identifying the team with the nation, football is a significant force in boosting national 
harmony.187 
However, these are short-term strategies that are definitely needed, but 
they only work as a partial repair. Partial repairs are ineffective when dealing with this 
type of problem, because failure risks the security and existence of the whole country. 
Long-term and consistent strategies should work side by side with short-term ones to 
enable unity supporters in the South to speak publicly in favor of a united Yemen. The 
support should be justified by not only their links to officials and Shaikhs but also by the 
actions and policies the Yemeni government has implemented. 
                                                 
.187 Stevenson and Alaug, “Football in Newly United Yemen.” 
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Therefore, the government has to ensure its messages have reached the 
poor, uneducated and tribal people, high, middle and lower classes. Words and speeches 
are not enough, though; actions should talk in this case. The Yemeni government should 
provide services in equal scale for all people in all areas with more focus on severely 
non-serviced areas. People in Yemen, especially in the South, need to see changes in the 
government tactics and the way it does business in order to change the bad picture they 
have developed over the last 20 years.  
Finally, the solution for Aden’s problems is still in Sana’a. Before taking 
any actions toward or against Al-Hirak or any other rebellion group, the government 
should treat its long-term disease. The government or, we can say now, leaders, who need 
to write their names in history, should act immediately to reform the government public 
administration, reform military services, and limit corruption. As long as the government 
is infected with corrupting disease, lacks the public administration, and is unable to 
provide expected services, it will be perceived as illegitimate and will be a potential Faid 
for Al-Hirak and other existing and potential opposition groups. 
2. To Al-Hirak and Al-Janubi 
Currently, Al-Hirak is a hostage of its leaders’ “flat view” when it seeks solutions 
to Southern problems. It failed to adjust its policies, activities, and demands with the 
changing national and international situations. It is led by old figures who have great 
experience but a history of sacrificing their peoples’ welfare for their own pride. 
Therefore, Al-Hirak leaders, supporters, and sympathizers should understand that unity  
is not the cause of what Southerners suffer nor is separation the solution to those 
problems. Therefore, a new course of action should be implemented, and all solutions 
should be considered. Al-Hirak should aim for the ultimate goal and not divert its efforts 
toward one of the means. 
Al-Hirak al-Janubi’s factions have initiated reconciliation and tolerance 
conferences (mutamar altusaleh wattusameh) among all Southern people which, if 
implemented correctly, will put an end to the Stoke sectarian strife between the people in 
the South. This initiative should be implemented, not only for the Southern people but for 
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all Yemenis. Al-Hirak cannot ask Southern people to forget and forgive and, at the same 
time, call for retaliation against their brothers from the North. The movement will be 
more legitimate by being consistent in its demands to its supporters.  
Al-Hirak Al-Janubi has opened the Yemeni government, the international 
community, and most importantly, the Yemeni society’s eyes to Southern grievances. If 
not for Al-Hirak, the Southern case would have no ears listening to it, or at least would 
not have the same amount of attention it has today. However, Al-Hirak has to be realistic 
about the future of the country if it is divided. Neither the North nor the South will 
survive if separation happens. Other solutions to the problem should be reasonably 
looked at to end grievances without destroying the country.   
Factions of Al-Hirak know how difficult it is to unify the movement. This 
indicates the future of the South if separation occurs. The movement cannot ask for 
separation on the one hand and unity among its people on the other. Having a president 
and many officials from the South could be exploited by the Al-Hirak movement to 
obtain its people’s rights and be a source for a greater country instead of a tool to destroy 
it. Al-Hirak Al-Janubi leaders should stop fighting each other and accusing their brothers 
who disagree with them about the means or the ends by being traitors. Freedom should be 
ensured for all Southerners and Northerners to speak freely against or for unity. 
Violence, although it is minimal, can affect the cause of the movement and make 
it easy for the internal and external enemies of Yemen to use it against the movement. 
Repression and violence should be stopped for the sake of the movement to get the 
benefits of its members’ sacrifices.  
“History has no mercy,” to my knowledge, is a true statement. Individuals who 
call for separation will be looked at as traitors by future generations, especially when Al-
Hirak fails, as is highly likely, to unify the county and fulfill its promises to the Southern 
people. The Southern people were very active in their call for unity and led to it. They 
have made many compromises to ensure the reunification of the country. Therefore, they 
will not forgive those who participated in or supported a harmonious country.  
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Finally, the NDC is a golden opportunity for all Yemenis to lift the country out of 
the quagmire and establish a modern democratic state that respects human rights, and is 
based on a separation of authorities and a decentralized system. The NDC is the way to 
make the impossible possible. Instead of marginalizing itself, Al-Hirak can benefit from 
it. The Northern people have understood the Southern problem, have surrendered the 
presidency, along with high government civilian and military posts, and are willing to do 
more to save the main principle that is not only theirs, but also belongs to the Southern 
people as well. Al-Hirak leaders can participate in the new administration and end the 
grievances from within the system, which will make Al-Hirak a bright spot in the Yemeni 
history. It will achieve its principles with less cost, and without sacrificing the main 
principle that their ancestors fought for.  
3. To the International Community 
The world is one small village. Due to the globalization of modern technology, 
advanced communications, and international trade, international member states are more 
dependent and more easily affected by other states’ problems. Political leaders, 
academics, and intellectuals can no longer ignore the disasters or failures of other states 
because those will affect them as well. In the world that we live in today, anybody’s 
problem is everybody’s problem. As Ashraf Ghani has stated, “The rapid pace of 
globalization and technological change mean that instability, insecurity and terror are 
now more easily exported than ever before.”188  
If left alone, Yemen is a potentially failed state. It has very few resources, a poor 
education system, and corrupt public administration that are faced with overwhelming, 
chronic, and complicated political, economic, and social challenges. Therefore, there are 
benefits and interests, along with moral and ethical responsibilities, behind international 
support for the RoY. The international community, especially the developed countries 
and international governmental and non- governmental organizations, are morally 
responsible for supporting the economic health and, more importantly, security and 
stability of the RoY. 
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Development Group, Working Paper 253, September 2005, 1–20.  
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The regional support represented by the GCC and regional powers is an excellent 
example of a beneficial and positive intervention by neighboring countries to ensure the 
security and stability of Yemen. The GCC initiative has saved Yemen from falling into 
unlimited and unknown problems. The U.S., Europe, Russia, and China have agreed on 
the importance of the stability of Yemen. Unity was mentioned in almost each resolution 
issued by regional and global powers, as well as the Security Council. The Security 
Council has provided extensive support during the transition period and to the interim 
president Hadi in his decision.  
The support of the NDC with finance and expertise is appreciated. It helps lead 
the country to a future with some light, instead of the darkness it was moving toward. The 
Security Council and the SG Representative, Mr. Jamal Ben Umar, have visited Yemen 
more than 22 times during and after the dialogue, and have achieved significant results by 
convincing many factions and local powers to accept dialogue, including some factions 
of Al-Hirak.  
The international committee has arranged for two conferences to support Yemen 
financially, which will result in support of development programs with almost 4 billion 
USD. Represented by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the UN has 
provided support to the transitional presidential election, and continues to provide the 
government with experts to help fight corruption and support improving public 
administration. 
The road ahead is still very bumpy. A strong economy is needed for stability 
success, and is very dependent on the security situation. Natsios states that “development 
cannot effectively take place without the security that armed forces provide. And security 
cannot ultimately occur until the local population views the promise of development as 
an alternative to violence.”189 
The international community, while encouraging the Yemeni government to 
respect human rights, opens more political space for expression and establishes more 
                                                 
.189 Andrew S. Natsios, “The Nine Principles of Reconstruction and Development,” Parameters 35, 
no. 3 (Autumn 2005): 6.  
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reforms, making it clear that separation is not encouraged and is not negotiable. By 
supporting unity, the international community closes many doors for potential and 
expected problems. However, this does not mean, in any way, that the international 
community should support the aggressive or unjust acts by the government against Al-
Hirak activists. It means only diverting the direction of Al-Hirak from looking at the 
means (separation), toward the achievement of the end (an honored and equal life and a 
modern state). 
 97 
APPENDIX.  PRESIDENTIAL DECISION TO ESTABLISH THE 
COMMITTEES ON LAND ISSUES AND FORCED RETIREMENT 
IN THE SOUTH  
President Hadi has issued a decision to establish committees of land issues and 
forced retirement of military officers and civilian employees. The committee consists of 
judges who are mainly from the Southern part of the country.   
 بونجلاب نيدعبملاو يضارلأا اياضق يتنجل ءاشنإب يداه سيئرلا رارق صن 
  
ليصافتلا 
 :رشنلا خيرات90 نوناك2 رياني/2902  
 
 سرب راو- تاعباتم 
( مقر ةيروهمجلا سيئر رارق سمأ ردص2 ةنسل )2902 يضارلأا اياضق ةجلاعمل نيتنجل ليكشتو ءاشنإب م
.ةيبونجلا تاظفاحملاب يركسعلاو ينملأاو يندملا لاجملا يف مهفئاظو نع نيدعبملا نيفظوملاو 
:هصن يلي اميف 
:ةيروهمجلا سيئر 
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 بعد الاطلاع على دستور الجمهورية اليمنية
 م.0092/00/22وعلى مبادرة مجلس التعاون الخليجي وآليتها التنفيذية الموقعتين بتاريخ 
وحرصاً على معالجة القضايا المتعلقة بالأراضي والموظفين في المحافظات الجنوبية وفي سبيل إنجاز 
 نية ونظرا ًلما تقتضيه المصلحة العامة.الحوار الوطني والمصالحة الوط
 قـــــرر
 ) تنشأ بموجب هذا القرار لجنتان على النحو الآتي:0مادة (
 أ: لجنة نظر ومعالجة قضايا الأراضي، وتشكل من الإخوة التالية أسماؤهم:
 القاضي/ صالح ناصر طاهر قاسم-0
 القاضي/ علي عطبوش عوض محمد -2
 المعشري القاضي/ داوود عبده أحمد -2
 القاضي/ محمد عمر باشبيب -4
 القاضي/ يحيى محمد عبدالله الإرياني.-5
ب: لجنة معالجة قضايا الموظفين المبعدين عن وظائفهم في المجال المدني والأمني والعسكري، وتشكل من 
 الإخوة التالية أسماؤهم:
 الرائد/ خالد محسن العكيمي-2العقيد/ حسين عبدربه صالح عبدان -0
 القاضي/ سهل محمد حمزة -4العميد/ سالم عبدالله العطاس  -2
 العميد/ علي عبيد صالح -6القاضي/ علوي عبدالله قاسم الأديمي -5
 القاضي/ ناصر علي عبده علاو -8القاضي/ علي عوض بن هامل  -7
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 القاضي/ نورا ضيف الله محمد قائد-0
 ) تعمل اللجنتان في ضوء الأسس الآتية:2مادة (
 تزام بالتجرد والاستقلالية والموضوعية وإعلاء المصلحة الوطنية العليا عند ممارستهما لمهامهما.أ: الال
 ب: عدم النظر في القضايا التي تم معالجتها من قبل أو صدرت بشأنها أحكام قضائية باتة.
امة والخاصة ج: يكون نطاق عمل اللجنتين الادعاءات بالانتهاكات التي وقعت على العقارات والأراضي الع
 م حتى صدور هذا القرار.9000أو على العاملين في المجال المدني والأمني والعسكري للفترة من 
د: الاستعانة والاستفادة من أعمال اللجان السابقة على صدور هذا القرار ونتائج ما توصلت إليه تلك اللجان 
 لضمان عدم تكرار المعالجات.
 وقراراتهما وإتاحتها للكافة عبر مختلف الوسائل الإعلامية المتاحة.هـ: علانية وشفافية إجراءاتهما 
 ممارسة المهام الآتية: –وفق الاختصاص المحدد لها في تسميتها  –) تتولى كل لجنة 2مادة (
أ: بحث الادعاءات بالانتهاكات المشمولة في نطاق اختصاصها بناًء على شكاوى وبلاغات من المتضررين 
ستقلة وشفافة بشأنها والتأكد من وثائق جميع الأطراف والاستماع لكافة الأطراف بشكل وإجراء تحقيقات م
عادل للوصول إلى الحقيقة التي تمكنها من إصدار قرارها العادل والقانوني المبني على أسس وحيثيات 
 جوهرية وسليمة.
اسبة ورفعها إلى رئيس ب: تقديم المقترحات والمعالجات العادلة والقانونية وتقدير التعويضات المن
 الجمهورية بتقارير ربع سنوية ليتولى إحالتها إلى الحكومة للتنفيذ.
 ج: وضع وإعلان آليات عملها بصورة تكفل سهولة التلقي وسرعة التنفيذ.
د: تقديم تقرير تفصيلي إلى رئيس الجمهورية في نهاية عملها يتضمن نتائج أعمالها وتوصياتها ومقترحاتها 
 عدم تكرار مثل تلك الانتهاكات مستقبلا.ًالكفيلة ب
 هـ: اتخاذ الإجراءات القانونية اللازمة لتنفيذ مهامها واختصاصاتها بالتنسيق مع الجهات المختصة.
 001 
 ) لأغراض تنفيذ اللجنتين لمهامهما، يكون لهما السلطات الآتية:4مادة (
 لطات المختصة عند الحاجة.أ: استدعاء الشهود وأي طرف يكون حضوره مهما ًوالاستعانة بالس
وعلى جميع  –وفقاً لما تقرره اللجنة المعنية–ب: النزول إلى كافة الأماكن المدعى بوقوع انتهاكات فيها 
 السلطات بما فيها السلطات المحلية تسهيل مهامهما.
 ج: الاستعانة بالخبراء المختصين والفنيين للاستفادة منهم في تنفيذ مهامهما.
 ائق أو مستندات أو تقارير أو بيانات تتطلبها أعمالهما.د: طلب أية وث
 هـ: الاستعانة بموظفين حكوميين للعمل تحت إدارتهما على سبيل الانتداب.
 ) تضع كل لجنة لائحة تنظم اجتماعاتها وآلية اتخاذ قراراتها وتعلنها.5مادة (
 ) على لجنة نظر ومعالجة قضايا الأراضي مراعاة الآتي:6مادة (
 عطاء الاهتمام والأسبقية في نظر وحل القضايا للحالات التالية:أ: إ
الأراضي المصروفة من الدولة للأفراد بحجة الاستثمار وثبت استغلالهم لها لغير الوجه الذي صرفت من  -
 أجله.
 الأراضي المصروفة من الدولة للأفراد بمساحة تتجاوز ما يحتاجه الفرد لبناء مسكن شخصي له. -
 ي المصروفة من الدولة للأفراد مدنيين وعسكريين كتعويض ولم يمكنوا منها.الأراض -
 أراضي الجمعيات السكنية التي تعرضت للانتهاكات. -
 الأراضي المشتراه بحسن نية أو عبر الصرف المزدوج من أكثر من جهة أو محافظة. -
 السكن غير الشرعي في بعض العقارات. -
في عدن بحيث تؤول ملكيتها إلى ملاك المساكن مع إلغاء نظام التأجير القديم  الأراضي التي بنظام التأجير -
 المطبق في عدن منذ عهد الاستعمار.
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 م.4000استعادة الأراضي الزراعية التي استصلحتها الدولة وتم توزيعها بعد حرب  -
ادعاء الملكية ب: معالجة وإزالة أي بسط على أراضي الدولة من أي شخص طبيعي أو اعتباري خاص أو 
بوثائق مزورة أو عبر وثائق أخرى معتمدة من جهات رسمية غير مخولة بهذا الحق أو سبق للمحكمة إلغاء 
 تعميدها أو توثيقها لهذه الأراضي مع معالجة أي آثار قانونية ترتبت على ذلك وبطريقة عادلة.
السكن من قبل الجهات الرسمية  ج: مراجعة ما تم صرفه من الأراضي لأغراض الاستثمار أو الزراعة أو
المقدم بشأنها ادعاءات أو شكاوى وعلى وجه الخصوص هيئة الأراضي أو إدارة المساحة العسكرية أو 
مكاتب الأوقاف أو مكاتب وزارة الزراعة، وتوثيقه عبر هيئة الأراضي فقط مع مراعاة المراكز القانونية 
 راعية التي أقيمت على تلك الأراضي.المستقرة للمشاريع الاستثمارية والسكنية والز
) على لجنة معالجة قضايا الموظفين المبعدين عن وظائفهم في المجال المدني والأمني والعسكري 7مادة (
 مراعاة الآتي:
 أ: من أحيلوا إلى التقاعد قبل نهاية مدتهم القانونية يتم معالجة أوضاعهم على النحو التالي:
 لأجور والمرتبات.: تطبق عليهم استراتيجية ا0
 : يتم إعادتهم إلى جهات أعمالهم إذا لم يكونوا قد بلغوا أحد أجلي التقاعد.2
 : يمنحوا كافة الحقوق القانونية من ترفيع أو ترقية.2
 : تحتسب لهم فترة التقاعد القسري لأغراض الترقية والترفيع والمرتبات.4
 معالجة أوضاعهم على النحو التالي:ب: من أحيلوا إلى التقاعد بحلول أحد الأجلين يتم 
: تطبق عليهم استراتيجية الأجور والمرتبات إذا كانت الإحالة قد تمت ما قبل الاستراتيجية وما بعدها ولم 0
 تطبق عليهم.
: يتم تسوية أوضاعهم التقاعدية وفقاً للدرجات والرتب التي كانوا يستحقونها قانوناً عند الإحالة إلى 2
 التقاعد.
 م منحهم كافة الترقيات والترفيعات القانونية والحقوق المكتسبة التي تم إسقاطها عنهم.: يت2
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ج: معالجة أوضاع الموظفين والعاملين في الوحدات التي تم خصخصتها ولم تعالج أوضاعهم حتى الآن، 
عقود الموقعة وبما يكفل منحهم كافة الحقوق والتعويضات وفقا ًلقرارات مجلس الوزراء الصادرة بشأنهم وال
 مع من آلت إليهم تلك الوحدات.
وفي جميع الأحوال، لا تحول هذه المعالجات دون تمتع المشمولين بهذه المادة بأية حقوق أو امتيازات 
 مقررة في التشريعات النافذة.
) على الحكومة السعي للحصول على المساعدة والدعم الدوليين لتمويل التسويات والتعويضات 8مادة (
 قررة بموجب هذا القرار كما يقع عليها توفير الموازنة التشغيلية للجنتين.الم
 ) على اللجنتين الانتهاء من أعمالهما خلال فترة لا تتجاوز سنة واحدة من تاريخ نفاذ هذا القرار.0مادة (
 ) ُيعمل بهذا القرار من تاريخ صدوره وينشر في الجريدة الرسمية.90مادة (
 ية بصنعـاءصدر برئاسة الجمهور
 هـ4240/ صفر/ 62بتاريخ : 
 م2092/ينايــــــر/  8الموافق: 
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